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Freedom in Mass Values – Egocentric, Humanistic, or Both?

Using Isaiah Berlin to Understand a Contemporary Debate

Keywords: libertarianism, self-expression, autonomy, dimensionality, democratic values, liberal values, moral permissiveness, factor analysis

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Introduction

Since the 1970's, there has been ample evidence of a shift in the values of ordinary people in affluent Western democracies. Numerous social scientists agree that there is a spreading commitment to individual freedom and self-expression, and that these values increasingly influence political attitudes and behavior.¹

However, the desirability of this value shift continues to divide social scientists into mainly two camps. There is a long tradition of scholars who interpret it as a rise in egocentrism. A commitment to freedom, on this account, brings the dissolution of rule abidance and solidarity between citizens, thereby risking the future of democracy.² On the other hand, there are also scholars such as Ronald Inglehart, who claim that the new emphasis on freedom revitalizes rather than erodes democracy. What the former account interprets as a generation of moral relativists is, on this view, instead a generation of humanists: individuals who have internalized authority rather than dismissed it altogether.³

This paper challenges the most fundamental assumption in this debate, namely that the two sides represent, as Inglehart calls it, two competing 'readings' of what is essentially one and the same empirical dimension of freedom values.⁴ My argument is that we are instead dealing with what Isaiah Berlin famously claimed to be two very different dimensions of freedom values: negative and positive.⁵ The present paper contributes theoretically by connecting these two discussions, and developing a framework for the empirical debate on how to interpret freedom in mass values. It also contributes empirically to our understanding of these values by examining two things that are often assumed rather than empirically studied: the individual level dimensionality of freedom values (1); and their individual level effects on openness to moral diversity and disrespect for rules (2).⁶ This is done by confirmatory factor and OLS regression analyses of data from World Values Survey 2005-2007 in ten affluent

Western countries. The present paper thus also provides the first large scale study of Berlin's distinction in connection to political psychology.

The results do in fact strongly suggest that Berlin's distinction applies to mass values today: there is not one but two co-existing dimensions of freedom values, positive and negative, with divergent effects on liberal democratic values – a possibility both the egocentric and the humanistic interpretations have neglected. Recognizing this is a crucial step in disentangling the links from freedom values to democratic attitudes. This may for example help explain the otherwise anomalous case of Sweden. According to Inglehart, this is where we find the strongest believers in individual freedom in the world. At the same time, the Swedes are in many ways the very opposite of full-blown liberal free-riders; in effect, they still show high support both for rule abidance and the criminalization of prostitution and narcotics.⁷ I show that this is perfectly logical if they indeed value positive rather than negative freedom. Similarly, these results may also help explain the otherwise puzzling finding that the recent rise of individualistic freedom values in China has not been matched by an equal rise in demands for liberal reforms.⁸ Again, if it is positive and not negative liberty that the younger generations mainly value, my results suggest this is in fact not very puzzling at all.

The next section begins with a brief recapitulation of the empirical debate on how to interpret freedom in mass values. I then introduce Berlin's distinction between negative and positive liberty and show that it allows us to better grasp the two main positions in the preceding debate, as well as develop a theoretical framework for their contrasting empirical claims regarding the effects of freedom values.⁹ In the subsequent section, I distill five empirical hypotheses from this discussion and present the measures with which I intend to capture them. I then discuss the results of the confirmatory factor analysis and the regression

models. The paper ends with a summary of the main contributions, their implications and suggestions for future research.

Two Accounts of Freedom in Mass Values

In *Democracy in America* from 1840, Alexis de Tocqueville famously warned against the erosive effects of individual freedom on community spirit. The American ethos, he claimed, was characterized by an unprecedented worship of freedom in almost all aspects of life and a remarkable lack of sentimentality towards the traditions and ties between people that at the time were still respected in ‘the Old world’.¹⁰ Since then, numerous studies of the values of ordinary people in affluent Western democracies, and in the United States in particular, have linked mass support for individual freedom to the alleged erosion of civil society, solidarity and morality. Although they often recognize that valuing freedom brings an unprecedented support for a diversity of different life styles, they claim that this comes at the cost of solidarity, rule abidance and genuine concern for the well-being of others. People who value freedom are portrayed as ‘narcissists’, ‘loners’ and ‘relativists’.¹¹ One vivid example comes from Scott C. Flanagan and Aie-Rie Lee, who portray libertarians, whose main characteristic is their ‘belief in freedom of thought and action’, in the following way: ‘Libertarians stress self-indulgence, pleasure seeking, maximum personal development and self-realization, using work as a means to other ends, weak group loyalties, and putting one’s own interests ahead of others’.¹²

Inglehart and Christian Welzel have found a dimension of values that, according to them, ‘overlap heavily’ with libertarianism: namely, self-expression values. Sometimes they also refer to these as ‘autonomy values’ or ‘emancipatory values’. Yet, they ‘suggest that a *humanistic* reading – interpreting this as reflecting an internalization of authority – is more accurate than the *egocentric* reading that Flanagan and his associates propose’. On their

account, valuing ‘freedom and autonomy as good in and of themselves’ entails not less, but more, individual responsibility for the common good. This is because freedom values transform authority from an external phenomenon, that demands obedience for its own sake, into an internalized commitment made by one’s autonomous self.¹³ This interpretation also goes against the notion ‘that everything is tolerated today, in a spirit of postmodern relativism’. Inglehart and his followers claim the opposite: valuing freedom leads to strong disapproval of discrimination on for example sexual or ethnical grounds, and to an unprecedented commitment to environmental protection. Thus, ‘many things that were tolerated in earlier times are no longer considered acceptable today, particularly if they violate humanistic norms’. Freedom values, on this account then, do not represent a liberation from ethical concerns, but simply a change in their content.¹⁴ Similarly positive views of freedom in mass values can also be found in the work of for example Russell Dalton and Herbert Kitschelt.¹⁵

The up-shot of this is that there are, roughly, two accounts of freedom in mass values. Using Inglehart’s terminology, I shall refer to them as the egocentric and the humanistic side, respectively.¹⁶ As we saw in the introduction, Inglehart and Welzel state that the two sides offer two competing ‘readings’ or ‘interpretations’ of the same values of individual freedom. Similarly, in a recent review article, Dietlind Stolle and Marc Hooghe note that the difference between them lies in the ‘normative’ conclusions they draw from the same empirical results. This also overlaps with Russell Dalton’s perspective, who criticizes what I here call the egocentric side for assuming a much too one-sided view of what it means to be a civic citizen, thereby similarly suggesting that the main disagreement regarding freedom in mass values is normative.¹⁷

I do not wish to dismiss this view entirely. The two sides certainly come to different conclusions regarding the nature of freedom values partly because they represent divergent

normative perspectives on democracy and good citizenship. However, their differences seem to go much deeper than that. While defenders of the egocentric interpretation state that valuing freedom leads to less individual responsibility and more freeriding, those with a humanistic one object that it leads to the very opposite. And whereas the formers claim that valuing freedom entails a radical openness towards all kinds of moral choices, the latter claim that the same values lead a person to strongly reject choices that are perceived as violations of humanistic norms. These disagreements cannot be explained by different views on the desirability of rule compliance or openness to diversity. They seem to be diametrically and, most importantly, empirically opposed to one another. The same values cannot possibly lead to both more and less openness and respect for rules. It is thus misleading to speak of different 'readings' of one and the same dimension of values.

Instead, I believe we need to recognize that despite their shared terminology, the egocentric and the humanistic sides often refer to very different freedoms to begin with. When those on the egocentric side state that a person values freedom, autonomy and self-realization, they equate this to valuing the lack of whatever constraints she experiences on her ability to do exactly what she happens to feel like doing at this very moment. For Flanagan and Lee, libertarians are characterized by the wish to 'remove all restraints on the free exercise of their autonomy'. The authors clearly think of autonomy as doing whatever one wants, since valuing it means wishing to 'allow individuals more autonomy and see them justified in taking various actions', even if the action is 'illegal or injurious to others'. If this is what it means to value freedom and autonomy, then it comes as no surprise that those who value it are expected to condone 'cheating on taxes, avoiding a fare on public transport, claiming government benefits that they are not entitled to', and justifying other morally questionable activities, such as lying or adultery.¹⁸ Robert Putnam seems to rely on a similar understanding of autonomy when stating that younger generations are 'insistent on autonomy', 'privatists',

‘cynical about authorities’, ‘self-centered’ and ‘loners’.¹⁹ We also find this close to amoral notion of freedom in *Habits of the Heart*, where the authors are clearly concerned by the fact that ‘freedom turns out to mean being left alone by others’, and for each person ‘to be free to strive after whatever he or she happens to want’.²⁰ In sum, for those with the egocentric perspective, valuing freedom or autonomy means valuing the freedom to behave as one wishes – regardless of duties (even self-imposed ones), moral certainties, long term commitments, and concern for other people’s wishes.

For the humanistic side, on the other hand, stating that a person values freedom, autonomy and self-realization seems to imply that she values a certain spiritual state or identity: to ‘form own opinions’, in Dalton’s words; or ‘the capacity to act according to one’s autonomous choices’, in Inglehart’s. Inglehart and his colleagues repeatedly state that this is a strictly human capacity, which suggests that we are not dealing with the freedom to behave as we wish, but rather the free use of reason and reflection. In fact, the latter even refer to autonomy as a theory of secular ‘salvation’ or ‘deliverance in this life’. This is all very far from being able to do whatever one ‘happens to want’ that we saw was equated to freedom and autonomy on the egocentric account.²¹

The up-shot of this is that the egocentric and humanistic accounts do not just expect different consequences from what are essentially the same freedom values. They differ already in their conceptualization of these very values, since implicitly they rely on divergent notions of freedom. As the next section will show, Isaiah Berlin offers the perfect tool both for understanding these notions more fully, and making sense of their divergent causal implications.

Positive and Negative Freedom

In his lecture, and later essay, entitled *Two Concepts of Liberty*, Isaiah Berlin famously distinguished between positive and negative liberty. Half a century later, this remains one of the most influential accounts of freedom in political theory.²² Yet, despite Berlin's great influence on theoretical discussions of freedom, he is remarkably absent from debates in political psychology. This is because his distinction has often been understood as one between two abstract concepts: the positive freedom to (engage in certain activities), and the negative freedom from (certain constraints).²³ His typology is also sometimes equated with the distinction between an effective and a formal, or an opportunity and an exercise, concept of freedom.²⁴ Nevertheless, recent work on Berlin has shown that these interpretations hardly capture the gist of his argument.²⁵ Considering his open antipathy towards philosophical abstractions ungrounded in political reality, it is just not very likely that he ever wanted to provide two ways of capturing what it really means, objectively, to be free. In fact, he explicitly says that the main difference between positive and negative liberty is not logical, but historical.²⁶

Furthermore, although Berlin's lecture clearly addressed the bi-polar world of the Cold War era, his distinction is not only historical. It is also psychological. The very tone of *Two Concepts* suggests his alarm and distress over the future possibility of liberal democracy to hold its strength against believers in positive liberty. Indeed, he begins *Two Concepts* by saying that he wishes to study two senses of freedom, and not just any senses, 'but those central ones, with a great deal of human history behind them, and, I dare say, still to come'.²⁷

Berlin never explicitly mentions values, but his description of the two notions of liberty matches well with what scholars of psychology define as a value, namely an 'enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence'.²⁸ Berlin says that the two

notions of liberty are ‘held in the world today, each claiming the allegiance of a very large numbers of men’. He repeatedly refers to these as two ‘conceptions’, ‘systems of ideas’, or ‘ideals’; and he often describes their nature and consequences in terms of what it means that ‘I feel free’, or ‘I identify myself with’ ‘the creed of’ one of the two freedoms. At one point, he even speaks of the two notions as ‘two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life’.²⁹ All this suggests that, although Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive liberty has not been applied to mass values previously, it appears highly relevant for precisely this topic.³⁰

Negative freedom, Berlin says, is the ‘absence of interference’ to pursue ‘our own good in our own way’. This is the freedom to do whatever we want unhindered by others. Since my negative freedom can only exist when noone else is restricting the acting out of my desires, whatever they might be, its very nature is action-oriented and directed at enemies external to myself.³¹ What matters for my negative freedom is the simple possibility to be free from external influence (from authorities, tradition, or the stifling conformity of public opinion) in acting upon my will; however inauthentic, heteronomous or unoriginal it may be. Thus, rebelling against authorities and conformity are at the heart of negative liberty. But Berlin is very clear that ideals like being true to one’s ‘real’ self (authenticity), or realizing that inner self (self-realization), or being governed by it (autonomy) must be separated from it.³²

Positive liberty, on Berlin’s description, is much less precise and consistent than its negative counterpart. Berlin repeatedly equates positive liberty to self-direction and autonomy in the more philosophical sense, namely as a freedom that we exercise within ourselves, by controlling our desires; rather than in opposition to the external world, which is where we assert rather than control our desires. He also counts the notions that man should be ‘critical, original, imaginative’, and strive for ‘self-realization’ and ‘authenticity’ as positive liberty.³³ Finally, he links it to humanism and notes that it has affinities to transcendent religion. For

believers in positive liberty, he says, ‘the place of the individual soul which strains towards union with Him is replaced by the conception of the individual, endowed with reason, straining to be governed by reason and reason alone’.³⁴ The common denominator for ideals of positive liberty, then, seems to be the quest for one part of the self, whether it is reason, imagination or will, to liberate itself from less wanted parts of the self, such as desire, impulse or fear.³⁵

Berlin’s typology provides us with labels for the two implicit notions of liberty that I found, in the previous section, to undergird much of the debate on mass values. As we saw, the freedom discussed by those with the egocentric interpretation most often boils down to the notion of warding off external hindrances to one’s freedom of action. This seems to be the essence of negative freedom – of pursuing, in Berlin’s words, ‘our own good in our own way’.³⁶ We also saw that those who forward a more humanistic interpretation of freedom in mass values tend to equate it to a belief in the strictly human capacity to form one’s own opinions and to realize one’s true will. On Inglehart’s view, valuing freedom is close to a metaphysical belief in the value of human self-realization, one that is not inherently opposed to authority or obedience, but only to what violates human dignity. We can now identify this as a positive notion of liberty, both because of its links to humanism, its focus on inner freedom and its view of freedom in mass values as a metaphysical creed rather than the wish to be left alone.

The observation that the egocentric side tends to refer to a negative and the humanistic side to a positive notion of freedom allows us further to recognize that they are not only talking about two issues that differ in theory. The main difference between the two liberties is, according to Berlin, that they are empirically different. After all, they represent ‘two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life’. In other words, then, we should not expect the fact that someone values negative liberty to imply that he also values

positive liberty, and vice versa. These are likely to be two separate individual level dimensions.³⁷ Furthermore, Berlin expects them to have different and often opposing consequences. As we will now see, his reasoning also provides a theoretical framework for many of the claims regarding the consequences of valuing freedom that we previously saw in the egocentrism-humanism debate.

Negative freedom, Berlin says, is closely linked to the idea that every individual should be allowed to live whichever way he or she wishes, as long as this does not infringe on the freedom of others. Indeed, it was precisely from this notion of freedom, he claims, that Mill developed his famous harm principle: that every individual must be free to act upon her wishes, as long as she does not damage anyone else's liberty to do the same.³⁸ It only seems reasonable, then, for the egocentric side to expect valuing negative liberty to induce acceptance of a wide range of moral choices, including potentially self-harming practices, as long as they stem from the individual's voluntary choice and do not harm anyone else.

Positive liberty, on the other hand, does not need to entail approval of diversity at all, Berlin famously argues. Instead, he believes it might often lead to endorsing only choices that are considered compatible with the positive ideals of autonomy, authenticity and self-realization. This may, on the surface, look like approval of diversity; but in fact it only means that one approves of one particular kind of choices: those considered autonomous or authentic. The reason for this is that positive liberty is not primarily focused on free choice but rather 'that men should seek to discover the truth, or to develop a certain kind of character'. And even though positive liberty in itself does not necessarily exclude any one life style, since it is more about how rather than what one chooses, its followers often presume to know that certain life styles cannot possibly be chosen by anyone's 'true' self. This in turn may lead them to conclude that they are justified in hindering certain choices, in the name of true liberty.³⁹

We can now make sense of Inglehart's insistence that freedom in mass values only leads to acceptance of a certain kind of 'humanistic' moral choices, whereas those violating humanism become even more strongly rejected than before. Inglehart equates humanism to valuing 'the ability to make autonomous choices'.⁴⁰ But he never quite specifies by virtue of what certain choices would be considered as violations of this ability and therefore in opposition to humanistic norms. Berlin, however, allows us to clarify this. Valuing positive liberty, on his view, does not mean valuing freedom of choice *per se*, but rather the freedom to make the right, authentic, autonomous, choices – in line with one's 'true' self. If a person values positive freedom, then, following this logic, he would only accept that other people made moral choices that he believed promoted or expressed their 'true' selves; whereas he would strongly condemn choices that he believed expressed inauthentic desires or non-autonomous preferences. For example, believing in positive as opposed to negative liberty might lead a person to condemn prostitution because she believed that even if prostitutes claim to have chosen their lives voluntarily, their choice nevertheless expresses an inauthentic will or hinders them from achieving true self-realization. The same logic might also lead a believer in positive liberty to condemn religious symbols, such as the veil: she might argue that even if certain women explicitly say they want to cover their face for religious reasons, they should nevertheless not be allowed to do so, since their explicit will in this case does not express their true self but is the result of indoctrination and non-autonomous preference formation.⁴¹

If we turn to the issue of non-compliance to rules, Berlin again gives us reason to expect opposite stands from believers in negative and positive liberty. He repeatedly claims that negative liberty is inimical to external authority, that its very nature is anti-authoritarian and self-asserting. Because negative freedom implies 'that all coercion is, in so far as it frustrates human desires, bad as such', those who truly value it, Berlin argues, will always be reluctant (and rightly so, he believes) to bend their will to what authority and rules demand.⁴² Negative

liberty, he says, is not only at the origins of ‘every plea for civil liberties and individual rights’, but also ‘against the encroachment of public authority’.⁴³ This suggests that the more I extol the negative liberty to act freely in accordance with my wishes and impulses, the more likely am I to be suspicious of authorities and regulations, and to disobey rules that I believe restrict my freedom.

Positive liberty, on the other hand, is not inherently antagonistic to authority or obedience. This is because it focuses on the question of ‘who governs me?’ instead of ‘how far does government interfere with me?’. Berlin even warns us that positive liberty opens up for legitimizing obedience rather than opposing it, since it suggests that ‘I am free if, and only if, I plan my life in accordance with my own will; plans entail rules; a rule does not oppress me or enslave me if I impose it on myself consciously, or accept it freely’.⁴⁴ Berlin clearly sees this is a risk; whereas Inglehart and his associates welcome the possibility that ‘the innate human potential for autonomous choice becomes an ultimate norm and a moral authority in itself’.⁴⁵ Despite this difference, both sides nevertheless connect this discussion to humanism and Immanuel Kant, whose commitment to individual liberty lead him to insist on an extremely demanding individual dutifulness towards rules dictated by reason. This suggests that we should not expect valuing positive liberty to lead to less but, in fact, more respect for those rules that one considers reasonable – simply because one, as Inglehart puts it, internalizes authority.⁴⁶

Berlin clearly defends negative liberty over its positive counterpart, and thus differs normatively from both the egocentric and the humanistic interpretation of freedom in mass values. Nevertheless, I have argued that a great part of his argument is not normative but psychological. This section has not only revealed that Berlin gives us a typology that differentiates between positive and negative liberty values. It has also shown that he provides us with a framework for understanding why the egocentric interpretation expects freedom, in

the negative sense, to lead to openness to diversity and disrespect for rules; while the humanistic side often expects freedom, in the positive sense, to lead to the very opposite.

Hypotheses

The connection between the empirical debate regarding the democratic consequences of freedom values, and Berlin's distinction between negative and positive freedom, yields the following empirical hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: There are two dimensions of freedom values, negative and positive. Berlin, as we saw, would identify anti-authoritarianism, non-conformity and independence as versions of negative liberty, and they are also attitudes that the egocentric side in the empirical debate tend to equate to freedom. We should thus expect that people's attitudes to these issues rely on their attachment to one underlying dimension: negative freedom values. Autonomy, authenticity and self-expression, on the other hand, are issues that we saw Berlin identify with positive liberty, and they are also attitudes that the humanistic side in the empirical debate tends to equate to freedom. We should thus expect that people's attitudes on these issues depend on their attachment to a second underlying dimension: positive freedom values.

Hypothesis 2: Negative freedom values lead to support for a diversity of moral choices. In other words, valuing negative liberty should lead a person to approve even of choices that he believes do not express or promote the chooser's own authenticity, autonomy or self-expression. As long as their choice is based on what they claim to be their own will and it does not harm anyone else, we must let people do what they want, even if we suspect it does not make them happy or even hurts them; that should be the philosophy of defenders of negative freedom.

Hypothesis 3: Positive freedom values lead a person to support choices that she believes to be compatible with the positive liberty of autonomy, authenticity and self-expression, but to condemn choices that she believes do not express or promote these ideals. The logic is this: freedom in the positive sense demands that we follow only our real, true will; and, ever so often, people think they want things that we might be convinced cannot possibly be the result of their true will. If we value positive freedom, then we will therefore be likely to condemn practices that we do not believe stem from a person's true will, but rather her fears or neuroses, even if these practices do not involve harm to anyone else.

Hypothesis 4: Negative freedom values lead to disrespect for rules. As Berlin suggests, there is something inherently individualistic and self-assertive over negative liberty, which should lead a person who values it to feel less obliged to follow rules of any kind, even when they are believed to be necessary or fair.

Hypothesis 5: Positive freedom values lead to respect for rules that are perceived to be reasonable. As the links between positive liberty, Kant and humanism suggest, there is a potential dutifulness inherent in positive liberty. This suggests that, compared to a person who complies to a certain rule because of external demands, a person who values positive liberty and believes this rule is reasonable is more likely to respect it even when there are no costs for disobedience, simply because he feels he is obeying his own free will.

Measures

In the following, I will examine the five hypotheses from above with data from World Values Survey, which is also the data source for Inglehart, Flanagan, and their co-authors.⁴⁷ I shall here use the wave of 2005-2007, which included for the first time a set of items that manage to capture the concepts at the heart of my paper: negative and positive freedom. Because the theories I assess primarily concern values in affluent Western societies, I limit my analyses to

the respondents from Western OECD-countries that were available from this wave of WVS. After listwise deletion, i.e. including only respondents who had answered all questions, the following countries remained in my sample: Australia, Britain, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. Table I shows the measures I will use.

(Table I about here)

The first three variables are operationalizations of positive freedom. *Autonomy* ought to capture the Kantian ideal of setting one's own goals, and *self-expression* and *authenticity* the romantic ideals of being creative and true to oneself. As always, when one uses questions designed by others a certain gap remains between what one wishes to capture and what data allow. In this case, the first and third questions ask about the experience, rather than the explicit desirability, of autonomy and authenticity. Yet, I think the importance one attributes to these values can be inferred from the extent one agrees that one tries to live by them.⁴⁸ Theoretically, these items also contrast visibly with negative freedom, which I here try to capture by questions that all focus on the freedom to act as one pleases unhindered by others. *Non-conformism* stresses the importance to be free from public opinion to behave as one pleases, *independence* the importance of teaching a child the value of freedom (presumably from its parents), and *anti-authoritarianism* the extent to which one values freedom from authorities.

The remaining measures will serve as dependent variables in the regression models. Since it is unlikely that we tap the underlying concepts that we are trying to explain by using a single survey item, I collapsed them into three indices, each ranging from three to thirty. This also makes my models less sensitive to measurement error in the dependent variables.

My third hypothesis distinguishes between two types of openness: towards choices that are believed either incompatible or compatible with positive liberty. I here try to capture the first

type with what I call with *radical openness*; and the second type with what I call *restricted openness*. In an ideal scenario, I would of course be able to test how the practices I include are perceived in regard to positive liberty. However, since the data here do not allow such a test, I leave this task to future research, and rely on the following logic:

From a modern individualistic viewpoint, the practices of prostitution, suicide and euthanasia that are all included in *radical openness* may be thought of as concerning only the individual who engages in them. Yet, these issues nevertheless remain controversial and to some extent illegal even in most Western cultures today. After filtering away the impact of religiosity, I believe the extent to which one approves of these matters is thus a rather good measure of how much one agrees that people should be allowed to do what they want to themselves, as long as they do not harm anyone else.⁴⁹ I measure *restricted openness* by an index that instead consists of the respondent's ranking of the justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce. This builds on the assumption that when filtering away the effects of religiosity, the reason that someone would disapprove of these practices is not primarily that they stand in the way of positive liberty, but something else. Thus, approval of these practices ought to capture approval of choices that are considered compatible with, and sometimes perhaps even necessary for, a person's true self-expression, authenticity or autonomy.

According to hypotheses four and five, I expect valuing negative liberty to diminish and valuing positive liberty to raise a person's respect for rules she considers reasonable. I measure this by an additive index that asks about the justifiability of *tax cheating*, avoiding a fare on public transport (*ticket cheating*), and falsely claiming government benefits (*benefit cheating*). I assume that although people may often cheat in reality and debate the levels that everyone should pay, they often still agree that it is only fair for everyone to follow these rules without cheating. Thus, approval of these matters ought to capture respect for rules that are considered reasonable by most people.

Two Dimensions of Freedom Values

My first hypothesis deals with the issue of dimensionality. I will investigate this through factor analysis, the basic aim of which is what we are concerned with here: finding out whether the observed correlations between a certain set of variables can be accounted for by one or several common unobserved or latent variables, also called factors or dimensions. Since hypothesis 1 already suggests a number of dimensions (two), I will make use of confirmatory factor analysis which, in comparison to its exploratory counterpart, is not only more adequate for testing a specific hypothesis but also sets the bar higher. It thus provides a more robust and specified test of different models and their fit to the data.⁵⁰ I will report three complementary model fit indices: the chi-square (χ^2), RMSEA and BIC statistics. A relatively lower value for all these statistics indicates a more satisfactory model fit for our data. The most important of these indices is the BIC (Bayesian information criterion) statistic, since it balances the need for correctly reproducing the true covariance matrix with the need for parsimony by ‘punishing’ a more complicated model with smaller degrees of freedom.⁵¹

Figure 1 shows the parameter estimates and model fit statistics for a uni-dimensional and a bi-dimensional model respectively. The first represents the assumption that we can collapse all the items into one value dimension; while the latter illustrates my hypothesis that they in fact measure two separate dimensions. All the results I present here are based on a pooled sample, but I also analyzed each country separately and found largely the same pattern.⁵²

(Figure 1 about here)

None of the model fit statistics support the uni-dimensional model. The highly significant chi-square value may of course be a result of the large N; but the considerably high RMSEA (0.13) and BIC (1705) strongly indicate that this model does not provide a satisfactory fit to the data. If we go from the uni-dimensional to the bi-dimensional model, the chi-square

statistic drops from 1789 (with nine degrees of freedom) to 291 (with eight degrees of freedom), which indicates a significantly better fit in the second model. The BIC value also shrinks considerably, from 1705 in the first model to 216 in the second model. This tells us that the bi-dimensional model is better even when we punish it for its increased complexity. Finally, in the first model, we see a high RMSEA of 0.13, but in the second model it falls down to 0.06, which is considered to indicate between an ‘reasonable’ and a ‘close’ over-all fit to the data. All this demonstrates that the bi-dimensional model is superior to the unidimensional.⁵³

Moreover, in the second model, all of the factor loadings have risen, (except for independence, which remains virtually the same). This suggests that in the uni-dimensional solution, the strong relationships within the negative and the positive freedom clusters are ‘polluted’ by the much weaker relationships across these clusters. In other words, assuming that all six items belong to one and the same underlying dimension, as we do in the first model, leads for example to the mistaken conclusion that *autonomy* and *authenticity* are not strongly related to one and the same underlying dimension. After all, their respective factor loadings in the first model are both below the common cut-off point of 0.3 (0.24 and 0.20 respectively). Yet, in the second model their factor loadings rise to 0.58 and 0.59 respectively, which tells us that they do in fact relate strongly to the same underlying dimension – but only when we recognize that this dimension is positive freedom and not just freedom in general.

This is not to say that the two dimensions are entirely unrelated. According to the bi-dimensional model, they have a significant positive correlation of 0.20. However, as this is far from a perfect correlation, we must still recognize positive and negative freedom values as separate dimensions. The data thus lend clear support for hypothesis one, which suggests there are indeed two dimensions of freedom values: positive and negative. The first dimension captures respondents’ views on internally oriented issues such as setting one’s own goals

(*autonomy*), being creative and thinking up new ideas (*self-expression*), and being true to oneself (*authenticity*). The second dimension revolves around the more externally oriented issues of doing what one wants despite of what others may think (*non-conformism*), teaching children independence (*independence*), and disapproving of more respect for authorities (*anti-authoritarianism*).

The Consequences of Valuing Freedom

Given that there are two dimensions of freedom values, then, do they affect openness to diversity and respect for rules differently? In order to study this, I computed a positive freedom scale by standardizing and summing *autonomy*, *self-expression* and *authenticity*; and a negative freedom scale by doing the same with the variables of *non-conformism*, *independence* and *anti-authoritarianism*.⁵⁴

Table II shows the regression results from predicting a person's *radical openness*, *restricted openness* and *disrespect for rules* by how much they value positive and negative freedom. Each model includes country dummies, to control for the potential effects of national culture or institutions. Also, since age, education and religiosity correlate with valuing liberty and are also likely to have an effect of their own on openness to moral diversity and respect for rules, I include measures of these three issues in order to filter out potentially spurious effects.⁵⁵

(Table II about here)

According to hypothesis two, we should expect negative freedom values to have a positive impact on openness to moral diversity, of both a radical and of course a more restricted kind. Thus, we should expect *negative freedom* to have a positive and significant impact in both

Model 1 and 2. The significant and positive regression coefficient for *negative freedom* in both models lends support to this hypothesis. However, since statistical significance is easily achieved by the mere amount of data points in this sample, we must go further in order to assess the substantial impact of *negative freedom* on openness to diversity. One way is to see what happens to the over-all model fit when excluding *negative freedom*. Indeed, when predicting *radical openness* without *negative freedom*, the standard error of regression from Model 1 increases by 2.2 per cent; and when predicting *restricted openness* without it, the standard error of regression from Model 2 increases by 1.2 per cent. If we instead exclude *age* from the models, they remain virtually the same, despite the expectation that age might matter for one's openness to diversity.⁵⁶

Another way to make intuitive sense of these findings is to compare two fictive persons. First imagine an individual, say a Frenchman, of median age, religiosity and education, who values positive freedom to the same extent as most people, but negative freedom one standard deviation less than the average person. Now imagine another Frenchman who is the same in all other relevant aspects (i.e. also with a median education, religiosity, age and positive freedom score) except for the fact that he values negative liberty equally much *more* than the average person. According to Model 1, the second Frenchman would be 1.7 units, or close to 14 per cent, more open to prostitution, suicide and euthanasia, as compared to the first.

We can use the equivalent example for assessing the impact of *negative freedom* on *restricted openness* according to our second model. We then find that a person who values negative liberty one standard deviation more than most people will be 2.23 units, or 12 per cent, more open to *restricted diversity*; as compared to someone who is identical to her in nationality, age, education, religiosity and positive freedom score, but values negative freedom equally much less than the average person. In sum, then, the data lend support to my

hypothesis two: the more one values negative freedom, the more likely one is to be open to moral diversity. This effect appears to be both statistically and substantially significant.

The results are more ambiguous when it comes to hypothesis three, according to which positive freedom values lead to more support for choices that one believes are compatible with the positive liberty of autonomy, authenticity and self-expression, but to less support for choices that one believes do not express or promote these ideals. If this were true, *positive freedom* would have a negative impact on *radical openness* in Model 1, but a positive impact on *restricted openness* in Model 2. However, as can be seen from Model 1, there is not a negative but in fact a positive impact from valuing *positive freedom* on the approval of *radical openness*, i.e. suicide, euthanasia, and prostitution. On the other hand, although this impact is statistically significant, one may doubt its substantial significance. Excluding *positive freedom* from Model 1 makes no real difference when looking at the standard error of regression; while, as we saw here above, excluding *negative freedom* caused it to rise by 2.2 per cent. We could also compare a person who values *positive freedom* one standard deviation less than the average person with someone who values it equally much more. If we filter out the impact of everything else, our model indicates that the latter person will only be 3 per cent more open to radical diversity (whereas, as we saw here above, the same amount of change in *negative freedom* resulted in a 14 per cent change in *radical openness*).

The impact from valuing *positive freedom* on *restricted openness* is, as expected, positive. Rather unexpectedly, however, it appears to be somewhat smaller than that of *negative freedom*. Dropping *positive freedom* from Model 2 only inflates the standard error of regression by 0.2 per cent; while, as we saw before, dropping *negative freedom* caused it to increase by 1.2 per cent. Again, by comparing the two fictive persons from above, we can see that the one who values *positive freedom* more will only be 5.4 per cent more open even to

restricted diversity. This seems only as a minor change when we compare it to the predicted 12 per cent difference that results from an equal change in negative liberty.

Although the results do not fully support hypothesis three, they nevertheless suggest that the effect of positive liberty on openness to diversity differs from that of negative liberty – not in direction, but size. While negative liberty does have a substantial positive effect both on openness to prostitution, euthanasia and suicide, as well as openness to homosexuality, divorce and abortion; positive liberty has close to none. Just as Berlin suggested, if we value openness towards these choices, we can only count on the supporters of negative and not positive liberty. However, contrary to what he suggested, it does not seem that the defenders of positive liberty condemn these choices any more than others do.

Hypothesis four suggests that negative liberty leads to disrespect for rules; while hypothesis five predicts that positive liberty has the opposite effect on rules one considers fair. Model 3 shows that, indeed, *negative freedom* leads to more and *positive freedom* to less approval of cheating on taxes, bus fare or government benefits. Again, we can compare two fictive cases. Let us assume this time that the same person for some reason changes her views on negative freedom over night, from, say, one standard deviation below the general average to one standard deviation above it, while of course her age, nationality, education, religiosity and views on positive liberty remain exactly the same. According to Model 3, such a change would result in her becoming slightly more than 14 per cent more disrespectful of rules than she was the night before. The impact of an equivalent over-night change in positive liberty would cause the same person to become 5 per cent *less* disrespectful to rules as compared to the previous day, which of course is not more than a small change. It is nevertheless worth noting that we find the expected difference between the effects of positive and negative liberty on disrespect for rules. In other words, the data lend support to Hypotheses four and five.

The models here above only represent a first attempt to investigate the consequences of valuing negative and positive freedom. Nonetheless, they show us an interesting pattern. They also give us further reason to believe that negative and positive liberty are indeed two different dimensions. If we were to collapse them, we would not only misrepresent their actual dimensionality, as the factor analyses have shown. We would also overlook the fact that they are differently associated with openness to diversity and respect for rules. The more a person values negative liberty, the more likely she is to accept both commonly recognized and more radical forms of sexual freedom, as well as euthanasia and suicide; and the more likely she is to condone free-riding of different kinds. The same is certainly not true for positive liberty. My results suggest that valuing positive liberty only has a minimal effect on openness towards both commonly acknowledged and more controversial moral choices. And, on the contrary to negative liberty, positive liberty seems to induce more respect for rules and less free-riding.

From this we can conclude that negative liberty certainly seems both deeply individualistic and self-assertive; and it has much the same consequences that Flanagan and others with the egocentric interpretation deem deeply worrying and that Berlin, on the contrary, judges to be the bedrock of liberal tolerance. Positive liberty, on the other hand, seems more responsible and respectful of shared rules as compared to its negative counterpart; just as Inglehart and his followers with the more humanistic interpretation have suggested. Furthermore, valuing positive liberty does not appear to fuel disapproval of life styles that clash with it, contrary to what Berlin famously argued. On the other hand, neither does valuing positive liberty *promote* openness to moral diversity in the same way as does valuing negative liberty.

Conclusions

This paper has offered a theoretically and empirically new approach to a most urgent debate among social scientists, namely how to interpret the spreading support for individual freedom in mass values; and whether or not to lament or welcome it based on its purported consequences for liberal democracy.

The theoretical contributions of this paper originate in the simple observation that those with the egocentric view of freedom values, who expect them to erode democracy, and those with the humanistic approach, who expect them to revitalize it, most often speak of two different types of freedom without acknowledging it. I have argued that we can identify these two notions with negative and positive liberty, respectively. By linking their discussion to Isaiah Berlin's famous distinction between negative and positive liberty I was able to develop a set of specific hypotheses regarding the nature of and effects of freedom in mass values. First, and most importantly, I hypothesized that negative and positive liberty are two separate individual level dimensions (hypothesis one). I also hypothesized that the former leads to radical openness to moral diversity (hypothesis two) and disrespect for rules (hypothesis four), which are what the egocentric side tells us to expect from freedom values in general. I further suggested that positive liberty would lead to *less* openness of radical diversity (hypothesis three) and *more* respect for rules (hypothesis five), which are what the humanistic side thinks we should expect from freedom values in general.

The empirical contributions of the present study consist of individual level analyses of, first, the dimensionality of freedom values, and, secondly, their effects on openness to diversity and disrespect for rules, using new items from the 2005-2006 wave of World Values Surveys. This two-fold approach contrasts from previous research on this data, which tends to include measures of freedom with measures of their purported consequences in one and the same index, thereby making true *per definition* what I have considered an empirical question

open for scrutiny.⁵⁷ The present study separates the issue of what freedom values are from their potential impact on openness to diversity and respect for rules. This yields a number of new insights.

My results strongly suggest that negative and positive liberty are indeed two separate dimensions. They also demonstrate that negative but not positive liberty is conducive to openness towards even the most radical diversity; and that while negative liberty also leads to disrespect for rules, positive liberty leads to the very opposite. It is not true, then, as Inglehart and others have argued, that valuing freedom in general entails an internalized morality or a heightened sense of individual responsibility.⁵⁸ Only valuing positive liberty has these effects. Neither is it true, however, as Inglehart's opponents often assume, that valuing freedom need entail what they call egocentrism, i.e. the approval of anarchistic self-assertion over social norms and support for the liberal harm principle. Only negative liberty has these effects. This may shed new light on the finding that younger generations in for example Britain are much more likely to condone tax cheating etc. than their elders, suggesting that what matters is not necessarily age in itself, but the type of liberty ideals different age groups tend to embrace.⁵⁹

The fact that this paper draws not only on statistical methods, but also relies heavily on theory, adds to the robustness of these results. Nevertheless, these findings need replication with other, perhaps qualitative, data and methods – in order to probe whether the mechanisms that underlie the relationships are those I have assumed. Moreover, in this study I have had to rely on proxies that are far from ideal for capturing the theoretical difference between, on the one hand, openness to choices that are believed to promote the autonomy, authenticity and self-expression of the chooser; and, on the other, choices that are believed to hinder the pursuit of these ideals. In order to be confident that we capture this theoretical difference and no other, we would need more detailed survey questions.

Given what is held to be the increasingly value-oriented nature of politics, future research should investigate whether negative and positive freedom are able to predict other political attitudes or even voting behavior.⁶⁰ It seems particularly urgent to investigate the amount of support for positive and negative liberty, respectively, across countries, cohorts and social classes. Berlin was clearly convinced that the most widespread freedom values are not of the negative but of the positive kind. Although the present paper has not studied this in detail, the descriptive data do point in this direction: when looking at where the bulk of the respondents place themselves on the negative and positive freedom scales, it is clear that positive freedom greatly exceeds negative in its popularity.⁶¹

By inviting political theory into the sub-discipline of empirical value studies, this paper has provided the first empirical support of Isaiah Berlin's distinction between negative and positive freedom. The findings also confirm his concerns that positive freedom is much less liberal than its negative counterpart. His distinction may help explain why high levels of self-expression values may co-exist with support for a strong welfare state, as in Sweden, or with authoritarianism, as in China. Positive freedom values are not always at odds with solidarity, and neither are they necessarily opposed to paternalism or obedience to authorities; only negative freedom values are.

Isaiah Berlin would lament this finding, especially if positive freedom exceeds negative in its popularity. Others, however, may welcome these conclusions, because they imply that growing support for freedom, if it is of a positive kind, does not entail individualistic self-assertion, disobedience or moral permissiveness on the verge of indifference. In either case, the finding that negative and positive freedom are in fact two different dimensions provides an important and indeed humbling insight into the complexity of human values. Often, such values are shown to lack the refinement scholars expect.⁶² This paper shows that in the case of

freedom, the opposite holds true: human values contain more nuances than previous research has acknowledged.

Tables and figures


Table I

Measures

Concept	Variable name	Question wording
Positive freedom	<i>Autonomy</i>	Respondent agrees on deciding one's own goals in life
	<i>Self-expression</i>	Respondent agrees on the importance of thinking up new ideas, be creative, do things my own way
	<i>Authenticity</i>	Respondent agrees on being myself, not follow others
Negative freedom	<i>Non-conformism</i>	Respondent disagrees on the importance of always behaving properly, avoiding what others say is wrong (originally reversed)
	<i>Independence</i>	Respondent chooses independence as an important child quality
	<i>Anti-authoritarianism</i>	Respondent agrees that greater respect for authority is a bad thing
Radical openness	<i>Prostitution</i>	Respondent rates its justifiability on a scale from never to always (1-10)
	<i>Euthanasia</i>	As above
	<i>Suicide</i>	As above
Restricted openness	<i>Abortion</i>	As above
	<i>Homosexuality</i>	As above
	<i>Divorce</i>	As above
Disrespect for rules	<i>Tax cheating</i>	As above
	<i>Ticket cheating</i>	As above
	<i>Benefit cheating</i>	As above

Figure 1

Model 1: Uni-dimensional



Model 2: Bi-dimensional




Table II

OLS Estimates of the determinants of radical openness, restricted openness, and disrespect for rules

	<i>Model 1: Radical openness</i>	<i>Model 2: Restricted openness</i>	<i>Model 3: Disrespect for rules</i>
<i>Positive freedom</i>	.091*** (.029)	.218*** (.031)	-.110*** (.021)
<i>Negative freedom</i>	.432*** (.034)	.557*** (.037)	.301*** (.025)
<i>Age</i>	-.016*** (.004)	-.040*** (.004)	-.063*** (.003)
<i>Education</i>	.280*** (.030)	.617*** (.033)	-.123*** (.022)
<i>Religiosity</i>	-.596*** (.020)	-.690*** (.022)	-.095*** (.015)
Constant	16.410*** (.324)	22.340*** (.352)	13.166*** (.243)
Adjusted R ²	0.202	0.322	0.108
Standard error of the estimate	5.915	6.501	4.540
<i>N</i>	10144	10396	10778

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All estimates are based on the entire sample (Australia, Britain, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United States). A dummy variable for each country was also included in each model (the coefficients are available on request).

Appendix

Variables	Min.	Max.	Mean	Stand. dev.	Number of observations
Indices					
<i>Positive freedom</i>	-10.10	3.55	0.016	2.091	12891
<i>Negative freedom</i>	-3.03	5.55	0.020	2.0	11455
<i>Restricted openness</i>	3	30	17.757	7.912	13996
<i>Radical openness</i>	3	30	12.975	6.729	13696
<i>Disrespect for rules</i>	3	30	6.540	4.681	14763
Separate variables (original name)					
<i>Autonomy (67)</i>	1	4	3.27	0.665	14025
<i>Self-expression (80)</i>	1	6	4.23	1.222	13113
<i>Authenticity(65)</i>	1	4	3.41	0.594	14111
<i>Non-conformism (87)</i>	1	6	2.97	1.382	13099
<i>Independence (12)</i>	0	1	0.60	0.491	15250
<i>Anti-authoritarianism (78)</i>	0	1	0.13	0.341	13409
<i>Abortion (204)</i>	1	10	5.26	3.050	14595
<i>Homosexuality (202)</i>	1	10	5.90	3.420	14335
<i>Divorce (205)</i>	1	10	6.51	2.752	14676
<i>Prostitution (203)</i>	1	10	3.93	2.831	14523
<i>Euthanasia (206)</i>	1	10	5.67	3.138	14308
<i>Suicide (207)</i>	1	10	3.35	2.722	14300
<i>Ticket cheating (199)</i>	1	10	2.30	1.999	14986
<i>Tax cheating (200)</i>	1	10	2.20	1.988	14941
<i>Benefit cheating (198)</i>	1	10	2.05	1.909	14890
<i>Age (237)</i> 'How many years old are you?'	15	98	48.06	17.462	15213
<i>Education (238)</i> Highest educational level attained	1	9	5.75	2.231	15108
<i>Religiosity (192)</i> How important is God in your life?	1	10	5.88	3.354	14908

¹ P. Achterberg and D. Houtman, 'Why Do So Many People Vote "Unnaturally"; A Cultural Explanation for Voting Behaviour', *European Journal of Political Research*, 45 (2006), 75-92; Edward G. Carmines and Geoffrey C. Layman, 'Value Priorities, Partisanship, and Electoral Choice, The Neglected Case of the United States', *Political Behavior*, 19 (1997), 283-316; G. Evans, A. Heath and M. Lalljee, 'Measuring Left-Right and Libertarian-Authoritarian Values in the British Electorate', *British Journal of Sociology*, 47 (1996), 93-112; Scott C. Flanagan and Aie-Ree Lee, 'The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies', *Comparative Political Studies*, 36 (2003), 235-270; Ronald Inglehart and Paul R Abrahamson, 'Generational Replacement and Value Change in Eight West European Societies ', *British Journal of Political Science*, 22 (1992), 183-228; Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

² Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler and Steven M. Tipton, *Habits of the Heart, Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (London: California University Press, 1996); Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1998); Flanagan and Lee, 'The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies'; Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism, American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations* (New York: Norton & Company, 1978); Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone the Collapse and revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2000).

³ See for example Russell J. Dalton, 'Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation', *Political Studies*, 56 (2008), 76-98; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence*.

⁴ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence*, p.292. For this perspective of the debate, also see Dietlind Stolle and Marc Hooghe, 'Review Article: Inaccurate, Exceptional, One-Sided or Irrelevant? The Debate about the Alleged Decline of Social Capital and Civic Engagement in Western Societies', *British Journal of Political Science*, 35 (2004), 149-167.

⁵ Isaiah Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in Goodin and Pettit, eds, *Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997), pp.391-417.

⁶ Although Christian Welzel has very recently presented a study of the civic nature of self-expression values, he fails to notice that we may be dealing with two dimensions of freedom values and that the effects of these dimensions may be different. He also incorporates approval of moral diversity (homosexuality, divorce,

abortion) into his self-expression values index, whereas I treat the relation between valuing self-expression and approving of moral diversity as an empirical matter. Christian Welzel, 'How Selfish Are Self-Expression Values? A Civicness Test', *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, (2010), pp.152-174, p.153.

⁷ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence*.

Also see Bo Rothstein, 'Sweden: Social Capital in the Social Democratic State', in Putnam, eds, *Democracies in Flux, the Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.289-332.

⁸ Zhengxu Wang, 'Before the Emergence of Critical Citizens: Economic Development and Political Trust in China', *International Review of Sociology*, 15 (2005), 155-171, p.162.

⁹ In line with Berlin, I will use liberty and freedom synonymously throughout this paper.

¹⁰ de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*.

¹¹ Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler and Tipton, *Habits of the Heart, Individualism and Commitment in American Life*, p.23-25, 48; Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism, American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations*, p.xvi; Putnam, *Bowling Alone the Collapse and revival of American Community*, pp.258-63. Also, for a less alarmistic but nevertheless pessimistic outlook on the value shift in Great Britain, see Peter A Hall, 'Social Capital in Britain', *British Journal of Political Science*, 29 (1999), 417-461, pp.448-49.

¹² Flanagan and Lee, 'The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies', p.238. For the definition of libertarians, see Scott C Flanagan, 'Changing Values in Advanced Industrial Societies: Inglehart's Silent Revolution from the Perspective of Japanese Findings', *Comparative Political Studies*, 14 (1982), 403-444, p.441.

¹³ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence*, p.291-2, 271; Christian Welzel, 'Democratization as an Emancipative Process: The Neglected Role of Mass Motivations', *European Journal of Political Research*, 45 (2006), 871-896. Note that although Inglehart claims this to be an aggregate, country level phenomenon, he and his co-authors also tend to treat it as an individual level dimension, which is what I am concerned with here. For this discussion, see Max Haller, 'Theory and Method in the Comparative Study of Values; Critique and Alternative to Inglehart', *European Sociological Review*, 18 (2002), 139-158; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence*, p.54, p.259-61.

¹⁴ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence*, pp.291-93.

¹⁵ Dalton, 'Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation', pp.80-82; Herbert Kitschelt, 'Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems', *World Politics*, 40 (1988), 194-234.

¹⁶ It should be noted that, as with all dichotomies, this is only a rough categorization; and it is therefore unable to represent all the nuances in a debate that stretches back to de Tocqueville's time, if not further.

¹⁷ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence*, p.292; Stolle and Hooghe, 'Review Article: Inaccurate, Exceptional, One-Sided or Irrelevant? The Debate about the Alleged Decline of Social Capital and Civic Engagement in Western Societies', p.154; Dalton, 'Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation', pp.81-82.

¹⁸ Flanagan and Lee, 'The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies', p.245, 242.

¹⁹ Putnam, *Bowling Alone the Collapse and revival of American Community*, pp.258-63.

²⁰ Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler and Tipton, *Habits of the Heart, Individualism and Commitment in American Life*, p.23, 25. This is also the case for most psychological studies on individualism (or idiocentrism, as Harry Triandis prefers to call the individual level phenomenon), where freedom is equated to non-compliance and self-indulgence at the expense of others. See for example Daphna Oyserman, Heather Coon and Markus Kimmelmeier, 'Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-Analyses', *Psychological Bulletin*, 128 (2002), 3-72.

²¹ Dalton, 'Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation', p.8; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence*, p. 31, 33, 43, 136-39, 144, 288, 290. Also see Richard L. Florida, *The Rise of The Creative Class: And How it's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life*, p.93, 105, 135.

²² For the sake of simplicity, I will here follow only Berlin and leave out the more recently introduced notion of freedom as non-domination, also often referred to as the 'neo-Roman' or 'republican' concept of freedom. This notion stresses that we are un-free whenever others have the capacity to interfere with our decisions in an arbitrary way, even when they choose not to do so. Although it may be interesting to study this notion in mass values, it seems to me that it has little bearing on the particular debate that this paper addresses between those with an egocentric and those with a humanistic interpretation of freedom in mass values. Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

²³ Gerald MacCallum, 'Negative and Positive Freedom', *The Philosophical Review*, 73 (1967), 312-334.

²⁴ See for example Carol C. Gould, *Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.39-40; Charles Taylor, 'What's Wrong with Negative Liberty?' in Goodin and Pettit, eds, *Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997), pp.418-428, at p.419.

²⁵ Berlin clearly separates both positive and negative liberty from 'social' or 'economic' freedom, which he believes is not in fact freedom at all but a 'confusion of words' (Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p.394). I agree with John Christman that this interpretation is more in line with how for example T.H. Green used the positive and negative distinction than with Berlin's version. See John Christman, 'Saving Positive Freedom', *Political Theory*, 33 (2005), 79-88, p.81; Avital Simhony, 'Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom: T.H. Green's View of Freedom', *Political Theory*, 21 (1993), 28-54, p.49.

²⁶ Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p.396. For similar interpretations of Berlin's purpose, see Christman, 'Saving Positive Freedom', p.81; George Crowder, *Isaiah Berlin, Liberty and Pluralism* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), p.78; John Gray, 'On Liberty, Liberalism and Essential Contestability', *British Journal of Political Science*, 8 (1978), 385-402, p.387; Bhikhu Parekh, 'The Political Thought of Sir Isaiah Berlin', *British Journal of Political Science*, 12 (1982), 201-226, p.221-22.

²⁷ Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p. 393.

²⁸ Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (New York: Free Press, 1973), p.5.

²⁹ Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p. 392, 397, 400, 412.

³⁰ One might ask whether existing frameworks in cross-cultural and political psychology have nevertheless inadvertently captured Berlin's distinction. Yet this is not the case. Singelis et.al.differentiate between horizontal and vertical individualism; but while the former concept collapses positive and negative freedom into one dimension, the latter deals with competition – something Berlin does not mention at all. Theodore M. Singelis, Harry C. Triandis, Dharm P.S. Bhawuk and Michele J. Gelfand, 'Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of Individualism and Collectivism: A Theoretical and Measurement Refinement', *Journal of Cross-Cultural Research*, (1995), 240-275. Schwartz, on the other hand, distinguishes between intellectual and affective autonomy. Although the former concept overlaps somewhat with my definition of positive freedom, the latter does not capture negative freedom and focuses rather on what I would call hedonism. Enjoying pleasure, excitement and variation, elements of what Schwartz calls affective autonomy, are simply not the same thing as

what I call negative freedom: valuing one's freedom to act unhindered by others. Shalom H Schwartz, 'A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explications and Applications', *Comparative Sociology*, 5 (2006), 137-182.

³¹ Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p.393-94.

³² Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p.395-96.

³³ Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p.396.

³⁴ Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p.400.

³⁵ Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at pp.403-04. This is the predominant interpretation of what Berlin meant by positive liberty. See for example Parekh, 'The Political Thought of Sir Isaiah Berlin'; John Christman, 'Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom', *Ethics*, 101 (1991), 343-359.

³⁶ Bellah et al. in fact recognize that they rely on a negative notion of liberty, but do not develop this further.

Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler and Tipton, *Habits of the Heart, Individualism and Commitment in American Life*, p.xlviii.

³⁷ Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p.412.

³⁸ Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p.395.

³⁹ Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p.398, 402, 405, 406. For a succinct recapitulation of Berlin's position on this matter, see for example Alan Apperley, 'Liberalism, Autonomy and Stability', *British Journal of Political Science*, 30 (2000), 291-311, p.306-7.

⁴⁰ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence*, p.292.

⁴¹ See for example Desmond King, *In the Name of Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Robert Jensen, 'Pornography and Affirmative Conceptions of Freedom', *Women & Politics*, 15 (1995), 1-18, pp.5-6; Jeremy Jennings, 'Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France', *British Journal of Political Science*, 30 (2000), 575-598, p.584, pp.588-91.

⁴² Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at pp.395-96.

⁴³ Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p.395.

⁴⁴ Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p.396, 402.

⁴⁵ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence*, p.292.

⁴⁶ Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in eds, at p.400; Christian W Haerpfer, Ronald Inglehart, Christian Welzel and Patrick Bernhagen, 'Introduction', in Haerpfer, Welzel and Bernhagen, eds, *Democratization* (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.1-5, at p.2; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence*, p.292, 26, 144.

⁴⁷ The dataset and further information about it is available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

⁴⁸ One might object that *authenticity* in fact measures negative liberty, because it asks about the importance of not following others. However, since the question begins with asking about the importance of ‘being myself’, I suggest it leads the respondent’s thoughts in the direction of positive rather than negative liberty: it focuses on finding and following one’s own unique identity, rather than simply being free to behave as one wishes.

⁴⁹ Admittedly, someone might disapprove of these practices for other reasons: because he thinks prostitution harms public morale, that suicide harms not only the individual but also the family, and that euthanasia gives doctors a risky power over their patients. A more ideal question would thus perhaps ask about the justifiability of narcotics, which more clearly speaks to the contrast between a person’s autonomous and explicit will. However, the latest wave of World Values Survey did not include such a question.

⁵⁰ K.A. Bollen, *Structural Equations with Latent Variables* (New York: Wiley, 1989), p.232.

⁵¹ The confirmatory models I present here are computed on a polychoric correlation matrix, a recommended solution for factor analyzing the relationships between ordinal and continuous data, see Karl G Jöreskog and Irini Moustaki, 'Factor Analysis of Ordinal Variables: A Comparison of Three Approaches', *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, 36 (2001), 347-404. Standard models, based on Pearson’s product moment correlations, were also computed and are available on request. The internal difference between the standard models was similar to that between the polychoric models, but the latter models showed considerably higher factor loadings for the dichotomous variables.

⁵² These results are available on request from the author.

⁵³ An RMSEA ≤ 0.05 is regarded as a ‘close’ fit, whereas ≤ 0.08 represents a ‘reasonable’ fit. David Knoke, George Bohrnstedt and Alisa Potter Mee, *Statistics for Social Data Analysis* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002), p.422.

⁵⁴ Weighting some of the variables in my index would make their interpretation less intuitive. I thus disregard the fact that some of these variables had higher and some lower factor loadings in the bi-dimensional model from the confirmatory factor analysis.

⁵⁵ Including income as a control variable in all models does not change either the standard error of regression or the regression coefficients for our variables of interest. These additional results are available on request from the author.

⁵⁶ This causes only a change of 0.5 per cent or less in the standard error of regression. These computations are available on request.

⁵⁷ See both Flanagan and Lee, 'The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies', p. 239-40; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence*, especially chapter 2.

⁵⁸ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, The Human Development Sequence*, especially chapter 13.

⁵⁹ Hall, 'Social Capital in Britain', pp.448-49.

⁶⁰ See for example Paul Goren, 'Core Principles and Policy Reasoning in Mass Publics: A Test of Two Theories', *British Journal of Political Science*, 31 (2001), 159-177; Luke Keele and Jennifer Wolak, 'Value Conflict and Volatility in Party Identification', *British Journal of Political Science*, 36 (2006), 671-690.

⁶¹ See appendix for descriptive data.

⁶² Philip E. Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Public', in Apter, eds, *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

⁶³ The error term of each parameter estimate can be calculated by computing the square root of 1 minus the squared parameter estimate.