

**Table 1: Lijphart’s Consensus/Majoritarian Democracy Variables**

<b>Variable Dimension</b>	<b>Majoritarian Democracy</b>	<b>Consensus Democracy</b>
<b>Executive-Parties Dimension</b>	Concentration of Executive Power in single party majority	Executive Power-sharing in multi-party coalitions
	Executive-legislative relationship in which executive is dominant (Parliamentary system)	Executive-legislative power sharing (Presidential system)
	Two-party System	Multiparty system
	“Winner-Takes-All”, disproportional representation	Proportional Representation
	Pluralist interest group system (“free-for-all competition”)	Coordinated “Corporatist” interest group system
<b>Federal-Unitary Dimension</b>	Unitary, centralized government	Federalism
	Unicameral legislature	Bicameral legislature
	Flexible constitutions amendable by simple majority	Rigid constitutions amendable only by supermajority
	Leg has final word on constitutionality of law	Laws subject to judicial review
	Central bank dependence on executive	Central bank independence

**Table 2: The Separation of Powers and Institutional Unity Dimensions of Consensus and Majoritarian Democracies**

Variable Dimension	Majoritarian Democracy	Consensus Democracy
<b>Separation Of Powers (SOP)</b>	Executive-legislative relationship in which executive is dominant (Parliamentary system)	Executive-legislative power sharing (Presidential system)
	Unicameral legislature	Bicameral legislature
	Unitary, centralized government	Federalism
	Leg has final word on constitutionality of law	Laws subject to judicial review
	Central bank dependence on executive	Central bank independence
<b>Institutional Unity (IU)</b>	Concentration of Executive Power in single party majority	Executive Power-sharing in multi-party coalitions
	Two-party System	Multiparty system
	“Winner-Takes-All”, disproportional representation	Proportional Representation
	Flexible constitutions amendable by simple majority	Rigid constitutions amendable only by supermajority
	Pluralist interest group system (“free-for-all competition”)	Coordinated “Corporatist” interest group system

- SOP variables included in this study
- IU variables included in this study

**Table 3: A Typology of Consensual Democratic Regimes**

		Separation of Powers							
		United Government				Divided Government			
		United Government		Oppositional Leg Majorities plus Executive		United Leg Majorities plus Opposition Executive		Institutional Unity without SOP	
Average Levels of Legislative Consensus over Time	with IU	without IU	with IU	without IU	with IU	without IU	with IU	without IU	
	Highly consensual outcomes	<b>Large cohesive coalition</b> No SOP mechanism effect Partial TH mechanism effect	<b>Large cohesive majority party or minimal majority + inter-party consensus</b> No SOP mechanism effect Partial TH mechanism effect	<b>Large temporary coalitions</b> Partial SOP mechanism effect Partial TH mechanism effect	<b>Temporary large bipartisan consensus</b> Partial SOP mechanism effect Partial TH mechanism effect	<b>Large majority cohesive coalition including executive</b> Partial SOP mechanism effect Partial TH mechanism effect	<b>Large majority cohesive coalition</b> Partial SOP mechanism effect Partial TH mechanism effect	<b>Minimal majority cohesive party + significant inter-party consensus</b> Partial SOP mechanism effect Partial TH mechanism effect	<b>Large cohesive coalition</b> No SOP mechanism effect Partial TH mechanism effect
Mid-level consensual outcomes ( $\approx$ TH)	<b>Minimal majority cohesive coalition</b> No SOP mechanism effect TH mechanism effect	<b>Minimal majority cohesive party</b> No SOP mechanism effect TH mechanism effect	<b>Minimal temporary coalitions</b> SOP mechanism effect/ TH mechanism effect	<b>Temporary minimal bipartisan consensus</b> SOP mechanism effect/ TH mechanism effect	<b>Minimal majority cohesive coalition including executive</b> SOP mechanism/ TH mechanism effect	<b>Minimal majority cohesive party + minimal inter-party consensus</b> SOP mechanism effect/ TH mechanism effect	<b>Minimal majority cohesive party + minimal inter-party consensus</b> SOP mechanism effect/ TH mechanism effect	<b>Minimal-majority coalition</b> No SOP mechanism effect TH mechanism effect	
Low-level consensual outcomes	<b>Minority cohesive coalition / atomization</b> No SOP mechanism effect No TH mechanism effect	<b>Intra-majority party dissensus</b> No SOP mechanism effect No TH mechanism effect	<b>Intra-legislative coalition dissensus</b> SOP mechanism effect No TH mechanism effect	<b>Intra-majority parties dissensus</b> SOP mechanism effect No TH mechanism effect	<b>Legislative-Executive dissensus or intra-legislative coalition dissensus</b> SOP mechanism effect No TH mechanism effect	<b>Legislative-Executive dissensus or intra-legislative majorities dissensus</b> SOP mechanism effect No TH mechanism effect	<b>Legislative-Executive dissensus or intra-legislative majorities dissensus</b> SOP mechanism effect No TH mechanism effect	<b>Minority cohesive coalition/atomization</b> No SOP mechanism effect No TH mechanism effect	

TH = threshold for bill passage

**Table 4.1: Scores for the Institutional Unity Dimension**

Country	Year(s) of Data Set Used	Effective Threshold/ Legal Thresh	Electoral Rule†	Parties in Legislature	Parties in Executive	IU index††
Argentina	1984-1997	.03	1	2	1	.48
Australia	1996-1998	.375	.5	3	1.5	.3958
Brazil	1989-1991	.0382	.5	3	4	.7495
	1991-1995	.0375	.5	3	5	.8
	1995-1998	.0375	.5	3	4	.75
Canada	1994-1997	.375	0	3	1	.25
Chile	1997-1998	.25	-.25	2	4	.17
	1998-2000	.25	-.25	2	4	.17
Costa Rica	1967-2000	.0821	1	2.5	1	.5703
Czech	1993-1996	.05	1	3	3	.8167
Repub.	1996-1998	.05	.5	3	3	.6917
	1998-2002	.1122	.75	3	1	.6127
Ecuador	1994-1995		.5	3		
Guatemala	1996-1999		.5	3	1	
	2000	.1314	.5	3	1	.5374
	1999	.015	.75	3	6	.6813
Israel	1998-2000	.02	.5	3		.8156
Mexico	1990-1993	.375	.25	2	1	.0625
New Zealand	1993-1994	.375	.25	2	1	.0625
	1999	.125	1	2	1	.4167
Nicaragua	1999-2000		1	3		
Peru	2001	.1239	1	3		.8851
	1995-1997	.02	.5	3	2	.6617
Philip.	1995-1997		.5	3		
(House)	1997-1999	.05	1	3	2	.7667
Philip.	1996-1997	.05	.5	3		.7889
(Senate)						
Poland						
Russia						

† PR = 1, Mixed = .5, WTA/Plurality = 0

†† Perfectly consensual = 1, Perfectly majoritarian = 0

**Table 4.2: Scores for the Separation of Powers Dimension**

Country	Year(s) of Data Set Used	Presidential System†	Executive & Legislative Veto Power†	Bicameral Legislature†	Federalism + Regional Autonomy†	SOP index††
Argentina	1984-1997	1	1		1	1
Australia	1996-1998	0	0	1	1	.5
Brazil	1989-1991	1	1	1	1	1
	1991-1995	1	1	1	1	1
	1995-1998	1	1	1	1	1
Canada	1994-1997	0	1	1	1	.75
Chile	1997-1998	1	1	0	0	.5
	1998-2000	1	1	1	0	.75
Costa Rica	1967-2000	1	1	0	0	.5
Czech Repub.	1993-1996	0	1	1	1	.75
	1996-1998	0	1	1	1	.75
	1998-2002	1	1	0	0	.5
Ecuador	1994-1995	1	1	0	0	.5
Guatemala	1996-1999	1	1	0	0	.5
	2000	1	1	0	0	.5
	1999	0		0	0	0
Israel	1998-2000	1	1	1	1	1
Mexico	1990-1993	0	0	0	1	.25
New Zealand	1993-1994	0	0	0	1	.25
	1999	1	1	0	0	.5
Nicaragua	1999-2000	1	1	0	1	.75
Peru	2001	1	1	0	1	.75
	1995-1997	1	1	1	0	.75
Philip. (House)	1995-1997	1	1	1	0	.75
Philip. (Senate)	1997-1999	.5	1	1	1	.875
Poland	1996-1997	1	1	1	1	1
Russia						

† For all variables, 1 = consensual (i.e., the variable identified is present in the country), 0 = majoritarian

†† Perfectly consensual = 1, perfectly majoritarian = 0

**Table 4.3: Consensus/Majoritarian Index Scores and Mean Consensus Levels**

Country	Year(s) of Data Set Used	Consensus/Majoritarian Index†	Mean Yes Vote Percentage
Argentina	1984-1997	.7029	.6951
Australia	1996-1998	.4479	.5532
Brazil	1989-1991	.8748	.5850
	1991-1995	.9	.5815
	1995-1998	.875	.5623
Canada	1994-1997	.50	.4957
Chile	1997-1998	.335	.7960
	1998-2000	.46	.7706
Costa Rica	1967-2000	.5351	.7190
Czech Repub.	1993-1996	.7833	.6592
	1996-1998	.7208	.6819
Ecuador	1998-2002	.5564	.8246
Guatemala	1994-1995	.5833	.7015
	1996-1999	.4374	.6515
	2000	.5187	.5134
Israel	1999	.53	.7285
Mexico	1998-2000	.921	.8251
New Zealand	1990-1993	.1563	.5227
	1993-1994	.1563	.4543
Nicaragua	1999	.4583	.5171
Peru	1999-2000	.8333	.7057
	2001	.8079	.9425
Philip. (House)	1995-1997	.7058	.9909
	1995-1997	.75	.9992
Philip. (Senate)	1997-1999	.8208	.5315
	1996-1997	.9095	.6632
Poland			
Russia			

† Perfectly consensual = 1, perfectly majoritarian = 0

**Table 5: OLS Linear Regression Results**

<b>Searching for Correlations between Institutional Regime Types and Mean Legislative Roll-Call Vote Consensus Levels</b>			
<b>Independent Variables (Separation of Powers Dimension)</b>	<b>t-statistic p-value R<sup>2</sup> N</b>	<b>Independent Variables (Institutional Unity Dimension)</b>	<b>t-statistic p-value R<sup>2</sup> N</b>
Presidential System	2.34 .028 .1861 26	Parties in Legislature	.93 .363 .0346 26
Executive and Legislative Vetoes	2.16 .042 .1681 25	Parties in Executive	.99 .336 .0516 20
Federal System	-2.05 .051 .1491 26	Electoral Rule	.31 .759 .0040 26
Bicameral Legislature	.18 .857 .0014 25	Effective / Legal Threshold	-1.89 .073 .1519 22
Separation of Powers Index	.66 .515 .0178 26	Institutional Unity Index	1.59 .127 .1124 22
<b>Consensus/ Majoritarian Index (all independent variables)</b>	1.54 .136 .09 26		

**Table 6: Classification of Democratic Regimes based on Institutional Characteristics and Average Levels of Legislative Roll-Call Vote Consensus†**

	Strong SOP	Medium SOP	Low SOP
Strong IU††	<b>Brazil (89-98)</b> <b>Czech Republic (93-98)</b> <b>Mexico (98-00)</b> <b>Peru (2001)</b> <b>Philippines (95-97)</b> <b>Russia (96-97)</b> Poland (97-99)	<b>Chile (97-00)</b>	<b>Israel (1999)</b>
Medium IU	<b>Argentina (84-97)</b>	<b>Costa Rica (67-00)</b> <b>Ecuador (98-00)</b> Australia (96-98) Guatemala (2000) Nicaragua (1999)	
Low IU	Canada (94-97)		New Zealand (90-94)

† Countries in bold type are those with levels of average legislative vote consensus over .55.

†† Countries were considered to have strong IU/SOP characteristics if their IU/SOP index scores were greater than .66, they were considered to be at the medium level if they has scores between .33 and .66, and they were considered low on the institutional dimension if their scores were below .33 for the respective index variable.