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**Divided Loyalties?  
A Study of Remittances Beyond the First Generation**

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### **Abstract**

Studies have illustrated the positive effect of monetary remittances on the economies of migrant-sending countries. Additionally, scholarship shows that the transnational behavior of first generation immigrant populations does not preclude civic engagement within the United States. This “politics of in-between” is negotiated on the immigrants’ own terms, but little is known of the scope, duration, or transmissibility of this behavior. In this paper, I investigate the remittance patterns of children of immigrants to examine the sustainability of politics of in-between over generations. Using the 2004 survey of Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA), I conduct a logistic regression analysis to investigate the characteristics of children of immigrants who remit, highlighting their civic engagement in the United States. I find that civic participation does not preclude the act of sending remittances among the children of immigrants.

## **Introduction**

Many immigrants leave their home country in search of a better life for their families. Upon arrival in the destination country, these immigrants set out to find work in order support those they have left behind. The money they send back, or remittances, contributes to the household income and livelihood of their back home. Small businesses depend on remittances for survival and families use the remittances for basic necessities, providing stimulus for local industry (Conway and Cohen 1998; Stahl and Arnold 1986). Migrant workers send their earnings back home where these remittances are injected into local industry, contributing to the economy of the migrant-sending countries.

Following foreign direct investment, remittances are the second largest source of external funding for other countries. Official recorded remittances<sup>1</sup> from the United States to migrant-sending countries are estimated to have increased from \$31 billion in 2000 to \$42 billion in 2007 (World Bank, 2008). While remittances are a source of foreign aid and contribute to the economic development of these countries, some argue that remittances are resources that could be spent on improving US communities. These commentators argue that money going overseas should be invested in the United States to create jobs, build homes and establish businesses. One such critic, Samuel Huntington (2004:213) remarks, “Remittances flowing out of America do not speak English.” Implicit in this statement is that one cannot contribute to the well-being of another country while remaining an active member in the United States. This paper explores this implication and investigates the characteristics of those who remit. Specifically, I

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<sup>1</sup> The remittance statistics were taken from the World Bank publication, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008*. The figures shown only take into account the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers. These figures do not include informal remittance flows, thus the true size of remittance flows is believed to be much larger

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investigate whether it is possible to be civically engaged in the United States and also send remittances.

Remittances fit in the larger body of literature of transnationalism. It is recognized in the field of transnationalism that the concept itself is difficult to define. Schiller, et al. (1992) offer a broad, general conceptualization of transnationalism: “a social process in which migrants establish social fields through geographic, cultural and political borders.” They go on to say that immigrants who are transnational develop and maintain multiple relations across borders. Key to the concept of transnationalism is that actions are taken and decisions are made within a set of social relations that link together the home country and the country of settlement.

This definition has served as a starting point to define transnationalism and scholars continue to refine the concept. However, there is little agreement on a single meaning, causing the field to become turbid and difficult to navigate. In an attempt to disentangle these refined concepts, Vertovec (1999) organizes the field according to six conceptualizations: transnationalism as a social morphology, as a type of consciousness, as a mode of cultural reproduction, as an avenue of capital, as a site of political engagement and as a reconstruction of locality. This paper explores transnationalism as an avenue of capital and more specifically, investigates the characteristics of those who remit.

While a rich body of literature accompanies transnationalism and remittances, the research does not explicate whether those who are civically engaged also remit. Moreover, the research has been concentrated among the first generation of immigrants. Because the children of these immigrants are now reaching maturity and moving from

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adolescence to adulthood, research on the transnational behavior of these generations remains nascent. What little has been done indicates that this behavior is the exception rather than the rule. While it is not expected that children of first generation immigrants remit to the extent that their parents have, a small portion does remit and their impact should not be disregarded. While the portion may be small, the number of those who remit in these generations may be large. Even if only 10% of the 23 million second generation exhibits this behavior, that is 2.3 million who could potentially remit, a substantial number. As these children transition into adulthood, they have potential to play an important role in this country as well as their ancestral home (Itzigsohn, 2000; Levitt and Waters, 2002, Jones-Correa, 2002).

In this paper, I hope to fill in the gap in the existing research by investigating the characteristics of the children of immigrants who remit. Moreover, I attempt to explore whether these children can be civically engaged in the United States and still remit. In this paper, I attempt to answer the questions, “Who among the children of immigrants remits? More importantly, do those who are civically engaged in the US also send remittances? Can one participate domestically while contributing to the economy of another country?”

### **Literature Review I: Political Participation Here and Abroad**

It has been well established in political science that socioeconomic status – education, income and occupation – plays an influential role in explaining political participation (Verba and Nie, 1972; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Conway 2000). The traditional socioeconomic model holds that those who have higher education, higher income and higher-status occupations are more likely to be politically active. Being

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politically active goes beyond the electoral activity of voting and also incorporates other activities meant to influence government. These activities include working for a campaign, contacting government officials, participating in a protest or demonstration, attending a political meeting, and making monetary donations to political candidates or to a particular issue (Verba et al. 1995; Conway 2000).

While the SES model is empirically strong, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) develop this model further by giving the model theoretical basis. These authors establish a link from the empirical evidence to access to resources such as time, money and civic skills. These authors posit that those with higher SES also have more access to time and money and this facilitates political participation. Additionally, they posit that the development of civic skills, organizational and communication abilities is linked to being politically active. The development of civic skills provide an avenue to political participation for those who are resource-poor because they can develop in a non-political setting, such as a religious institution.

This refined model explains many factors that lead to higher levels of participation, however, the role of race, ethnicity and immigration must also be taken into account. Prior to 1965, immigrants coming to the US were primarily from European countries such as Italy, Russia, Poland and Germany (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2005). The political incorporation of these immigrants varied due to past political socialization in home country and their commitment to return. Those who were politically involved were mainly mobilized by an ethnic consciousness by urban “political machines.” This mobilization effort led to politically active European immigrants by the 1930s (Portes and Rumbaut 2005; Stearne 2001). As restrictions on immigration tightened, the European

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immigrants became more incorporated into US society, eventually redefining “mainstream America” (Alba and Nee 2003). In 1965, the Hart-Cellar Act was passed that lifted national-origin quotas increasing immigration from Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia (Bloemraad 2006).

The incorporation of these immigrants followed a different trajectory than that of the European predecessors. With this new group of immigrants, the traditional predictors of political participation cannot be applied uniformly. Whereas previous data on old immigration relied on anecdotal evidence, the data on contemporary immigrants is empirically rich and scholars have found that citizenship status, country of origin, linguistic barriers, age and length of stay must be incorporated when investigating the political participation of immigrants (Uhlaner, et al. 1989; Lien 1994).

While these sociodemographic characteristics are pertinent, they do not overshadow the importance that ethnicity plays. Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewiet (1989) find that sociodemographic characteristics account for differences in political participation between whites and Latinos; however, the case for Asian Americans remains complex. Building on these findings, Lien (1994) finds that SES does not predict participation among Asian Americans as consistently as it does for other ethnic groups. Additionally, Junn (1999) finds that the behavior of these immigrant groups also varies in terms of how they choose to participate. Her study shows that Asian Americans are more likely to give money to a political campaign and contact a government official than Hispanics, but Hispanics are more likely to vote than Asian Americans. Because Asian-Americans are not homogeneous group and cultural differences are found among the different subgroups, intra-group differences are also found. Uhlaner, et al. (1989) find that

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Chinese Americans are more likely to vote than Japanese Americans, Korean Americans and Filipino Americans, whereas Japanese Americans are more likely to contribute money.

Adding further complexity of immigrant political participation is the emotional bond immigrants have with the home country. This bond gives rise to sentimental feelings and immigrants continue to maintain ties to their homeland by engaging in transnational activities such as visiting home country, sending money, and maintaining social networks (Schiller, et al. 1992). Despite the recent attention that has been given to transnational activities of immigrants, maintaining ties to the home country is not a new phenomenon. European immigrants were partaking in transnational activities, remained concerned in homeland issues, and many returned to their homeland (Foner 1997; Morawska 2005; Kasinitz, et al. 2008). Today, the controversy surrounding immigrant transnational practices pivots around the idea that “dual loyalties” that may threaten a unified America (Kasinitz, et al. 2008:258). Huntington (2004) echoes these concerns and warns of an immigrant fifth column that seeks to undermine American identity. Adding to the controversy are migrant-sending countries who institute programs aimed at increasing loyalties to the home country (Roberts, et al. 1999; Jones-Correa 2003).

Contrary to these speculations, research has shown that engaging in transnational activities actually helps to develop skills that are utilized in domestic participation (DeSipio 2006; Portes and Rumbaut 2005). Thus, those who engage in transnational political activities such as home country elections and organizational membership in home country are also engaged in political activities in the United States. These findings suggest that immigrants continue to be attached to their homeland and hope to influence



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US foreign policy by engaging in activities such as protest, organizational membership and voting in the US. Additionally, studies also suggest that immigrants engage in transnational activities to influence conditions in their home country (Goldring 1996; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Pantoja 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2005). The findings have been consistent for both Latino and Asian immigrant groups (DeSipio 2003; Lien et al. 2004; Pantoja 2005).

In response to migrant transnational activity, governments of migrant-sending countries have begun to introduce programs that encourage transnationalism. From the perspective of these countries, allowing migrants to engage in the home country also translates into more investment and contributions to that country (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). In efforts to fundraise, political parties from some countries, such as the Dominican Republic, reach out to migrants for monetary support (Jones-Correa 2003). Graham (1997:101) estimates migrant contributions account for 15% of Dominican parties' fundraising revenue. Some Latin American countries provide incentives such as dual citizenship and formal political representation in order to maintain investments, including remittances (Roberts, et al. 1999; Guarnizo 2003). Governments in Asia have also implemented policies and incentives to encourage migrant participation. In the Philippines, the Balikbayan Program grants remittance senders up to \$2,000 in tax-free stores when visiting (Hugo 2005). The Vietnamese government has also relaxed its policies on remittances. After 12 years of preventing overseas migrants from sending money to family, by the mid-1980s this policy was lifted, by the late nineties tax on remittances were reduced (Ha 2002; Hernandez-Coss 2005). Though these policies are meant to spur development in these countries and are implemented to encourage loyalty,

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they have potential to work at odds with the intent of governments. Jones-Correa (2003:1006) discusses the competing interests of sending nations in creating these incentives. While the sending nations may receive remittances and can use investments toward economic developments, governments run a risk of giving migrants a disproportionate amount of political leverage in the country and these migrants can act as a “loose cannon.”

Nevertheless, migrant-sending countries value remittances and go the lengths of enacting policies to encourage the remittances. Remittances are a source of foreign exchange and countries have come depend on this resource for their own development. Given the importance of receiving remittances for the migrant-sending country and taking the perspective that remittances serve as a political leverage that migrants can use in order to influence their home country (Jones-Correa 2003), it is surprising that studies that have investigated transnational political activities do not include sending remittances as a political act.

### **Lit Review II: Remittances**

While remittances can act as political leverage in other countries, few studies have explored remittances in this regard. Rather, studies that have explored remittances have investigated the effect remittances have had on migrant-sending countries that receive the remittances and studies on the determinants of the decision to remit (for example, Lucas and Stark 1985; Funkhouser 1995; Maimbo and Ratha 2005; Terry 2005). Stark (1995) suggests that migrants remit for various reasons including altruism, self-interest, and strategic motives. Altruistic reasons include caring for families left behind; self-interest encompasses hopes of inheritance or return back to the home

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country; strategic motives involve remittances being used as an incentive to keep other migrants from leaving the home country in order to protect wages of the sender. On the other hand, studies that investigate the developmental effect of remittances find that remittances bring immediate benefits to the receiving household and this may have a spillover effect to the national economy. Remittances provide a stimulus to businesses in the locality where they are received and may also be invested in various business sectors (Stahl and Arnold, 1986; Ratha, 2005). Additionally, remittances can prevent economic crisis, thus promoting political stability in these countries (de la Garza and Orozco, 2002).

Regardless of motive of sending money to the home country, sending remittances is a practice that varies among the immigrant population. Much of this variation is due to socioeconomic factors as well as national origin group variation. Of those who do remit, a significant portion of the population sends money back to family on a monthly basis. Orozco (2005:309) finds that 60% of immigrants remit regularly. Those who do remit regularly are generally new migrants who do not expect to make permanent residence and anticipate maintaining links to the country of origin (Lozano-Ascencio 2005). Suro (2005:23) supports this finding and shows that at least half of all Latino immigrants who have been in the US for less than 10 years regularly send remittances. Though sending remittances decrease with the amount of time spent in US, almost a quarter of Latino immigrants who has lived in the US for 20-30 years continue to send remittances (Bendixen Associates 2004; Suro 2005). This seems to be the case for Asian Americans as well. In interviews of 44 Vietnamese-Americans, Ha (2002:113) finds that all of the interviewees either sent regularly sent remittances or knew someone who did. Another

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aspect that can affect the regularity and increase in remittances is the role of natural disasters such as monsoons, tsunamis, and earthquakes. During these times of natural disasters or economic instability of migrant-sending countries, the flow of remittances tends to increase. For example, in the late nineties, Ecuador experienced an economic collapse in the aftermath of El Niño coupled with a depressed oil market. In the midst of this economic collapse, remittances tripled over the next six years (Suro 2005:34). Savage and Harvey (2007) also report a substantial increase in remittances after natural disasters in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Grenada.

While length of residency as well as response to crisis are factors that may predict the remittance behaviors of immigrants, scholars have also found that the decision to remit is also affected by demographic and household characteristics and level of assimilation into US society. Demographic characteristics include age, education, income and gender. Since remitting requires a certain amount of disposable income, those with higher income are more likely to remit. On the other hand, higher levels of education are found to be a strong negative indicator on the decision to remit. This seems counterintuitive given the correlation between income and education, but it is a finding that has been empirically shown consistently (for example Massey and Basem 1992; Funkhouser 1995; DeSipio 2000). One explanation could be that higher education is also related to length of stay in US and this may account for the negative relationship. This explanation is partially supported by Lowell and de la Garza's (2002:20) finding that immigrants in higher income categories are no more likely to remit than those in moderate income categories, presuming that income rises with length of residence.

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The effect of age is inconsistent across studies. In their study about Salvadoran and Filipino immigrants in Los Angeles, Menjivar, et al. (1998) find a quadratic pattern in regards to age. Older and younger Filipino immigrants are more likely to remit and those who are middle-aged are less likely to remit. However, in his studies on Latinos, DeSipio (2000) found that as age increases, the likelihood to remit decreases. Overall, these studies agree that this may not be an effect of age but rather length of residency in the US, which is said to decrease the likelihood to remit. In sum, the effect of education, income and age seem to be overtaken by that of length of residence.

In addition to these demographic characteristics, household characteristics are also significant predictors on the decision to remit. These characteristics include presence of dependents in household and presence of family living in receiving country. The presence of dependents in household reduces the likelihood of remitting while the presence of children in the receiving country increases this likelihood (Massey and Basem, 1992; Funkhouser, 1995; Menjivar, et. al, 1998; DeSipio, 2000). This is expected because presence of children in the US indicates a financial obligation in the US whereas having family in the home country indicates a financial obligation in the home country.

In addition to length of residency, other measures of assimilation studies have used include English speaking ability, years in US and citizenship status. Generally speaking, these measures have been shown to decrease the likelihood of remitting but the only significant predictor is years spent in the United States. Additionally, a moderate negative effect has been shown in regards to whether an immigrant has been naturalized or documented (Funkhouser, 1995; Menjivar, et. al, 1998; DeSipio, 2000).

### **Lit Review III: Children of Immigrants**

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The research discussed in the previous sections focus on the patterns of political participation and transnational activities of the first generation of contemporary immigrants. The research on the first generation is integral to understanding contemporary immigrant behavior and political participation. Moreover, the studies have provided scholars with a stepping-stone to further expand the field into later generations. The story of incorporation of children of immigrants from European immigration is one of “straight-line” assimilation. These children gradually assimilated into American society by adopting the English language, embracing American culture and identity, making it absorption into society straightforward (Portes and Rumbaut 2005; Zhou 2001). Numerous studies have conducted to illustrate that the new generation of children of immigrants do not follow this same path of integration into American society (see for example Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1997). Literature about the second generation includes not only the US-born children, but also immigrant children who arrived to the US before reaching adulthood. Rumbaut and Ima (1988) coined the term 1.5 generation to describe these children who share characteristics with both the first and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation, but may behave in ways that are distinct from the either. This concept has been accepted in scholarly works and it is generally agreed that the 1.5 generation differ in the socialization into society and also have different orientation toward their country of origin (Zhou 1997).

The studies that have investigated the trajectory of children of immigrants in the contemporary period have been primarily concerned with the social and economic mobility of these children. Comparatively, the political incorporation of these children of immigrants has not met the same breadth as the research on social and economic

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incorporation. Political incorporation has included observing electoral and non-electoral activities. Observing vote choice in 2004 elections among generations of Mexican-Americans, DeSipio and Uhlaner (2007) find that third and beyond generation diverged from the candidate choice of the first and second generation even when accounting for interaction between generation and partisanship and religion. Ramakrishnan and Epenshade (2001) find that after controlling for resources, social incorporation, and mobilization the likelihood of participating among second generation Latinos decreases. On the other hand, second generation Asian Americans are more likely to vote than first generation Asian Americans but voting decreases by the third generation. The trajectories of Latino and Asian American children of immigrant diverges in electoral studies, but studies that go beyond electoral participation find that there is a straight-line assimilation comparable to that of the European immigrants. Regardless of ethnicity, children of immigrants<sup>2</sup> are more likely to be politically interested, to participate in a campaign and volunteer in non-political organization (Pearson and Citrin 2007; Ramakrishnan 2007).

Alongside the growing scholarship on domestic political incorporation of children of immigrants has been investigation of the transnational activities of these children. Levitt, et. al. (2002) find a minority of children of immigrants are involved in transnational activities but this will likely decline with time. In their study of children of immigrants in New York<sup>3</sup>, Kasinitz, et. al. (2008) report a moderate percentage participate in transnational activities such as visits to home country, interest in politics of home country and sending remittances. Despite these findings, transnational activities

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<sup>2</sup> Children of immigrants refers to children of immigrants who came after 1965 unless indicated otherwise.

<sup>3</sup> The immigrant groups observed by these authors are Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, West Indians, South Americans, Chinese and Russian Jews.

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among children of immigrants should not be dismissed. Transnational practices vary over the life course of an individual and by national origin group. It is also likely that these children of immigrants pass on some transnational practices to their children. Until the effect that transnationalism has on countries, sending and receiving, investigation should continue in order to enrich understanding of the concept (Levitt 2002; Smith 2002).

Because migrant-sending countries benefit from remittances, this particular aspect of transnationalism should especially not be disregarded among the children of immigrants. Remittances over generations may decline for some groups, but diaspora groups are likely to continue to remit beyond second generation (Sander and Maimbo 2005). Clarke and Drinkwater (2001) find that remittances may actually increase in successive generations because children obtain higher-paying jobs than their parents. It is recognized that remitting in successive generations is not common and the volume of remittances generally declines over time as an effect of generation as well as length of time in the United States. Thus, maintaining a steady flow will require a steady flow of new immigrants (DeSipio 2002; Connell and Brown 2005).

As previously mentioned, remittance behavior of first generation is well documented. However, few studies have explored the characteristics of those who remit among the children of immigrants. Rumbaut (2002) reports approximately 19% of children of immigrants send remittances. The motivation for these children may not be considered altruistic, self-interest or strategic. Rather, it has been suggested that children of immigrants remit because of burden inherited from their parents. For example, children of Tongan immigrants in New Zealand send remittances only when pressure is



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applied from their parents. This creates a sense of duty for these children and often they fall into debt (Connell and Brown 2005). It goes to follow that children of immigrants may take up the familial responsibility when their parents pass away (Kasinitz, et. al. 2005).

In sum, the trajectory of the children of immigrants has been complex and varies by ethnicity. The social and economic mobility does not follow a straight-line whereas civic engagement does. Electoral behavior of the second generation Latinos decreases whereas for Asians, it increases. Regardless of ethnicity, children of immigrants are less likely to send remittances than the first generation. Additionally, previous scholarship that primarily focused on the first generation has shown that participating in transnational political activities increases the likelihood of domestic political participation. However, none of these studies addresses the role remittances may play as political leverage. In this paper, I look at the characteristics of the children of immigrants who remit. More importantly, I look at the relationship between domestic political participation and sending money abroad and ask, do the children of immigrants who are politically active in the United States send remittances?

### **Hypothesis**

In the realm of civic engagement, children of immigrants are more likely to participate than their parents, however are not as active in their transnational behavior. In regards to remittances, those who send money to their ancestral country<sup>4</sup> are more likely to do so if they are taken on this responsibility from their parents. This sense of familial

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<sup>4</sup> Ancestral home refers to the country in which the respondents mother and/or father was born.

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responsibility is also reflected in social responsibility to society, thus it is anticipated that responsibility in civic life will translate to responsibility towards the family.

*H1: The more civically engaged in the United States the children of immigrants are, the more likely they are to remit.*

However, since children are more likely to participate in US domestic life and less likely to participate transnationally, it could be an indication that they are less likely to feel they have a stake in their ancestral country and do not seek to influence that government in the way that their parents may have. Thus an alternative hypothesis follows.

*H2: The more civically engaged in the United States the children of immigrants are, the less likely they are to remit.*

Since the 1.5 generation are neither fully a part of their home country nor their country of settlement (Rumbaut 1991), they behave in different manners than either the first generation or the second generation. It is anticipated that differences will exist between the generations and characteristics that reflect a different socialization and orientation to society will determine remittance behavior of each generation.

*H3: 1.5 generation and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation will differ in the characteristics that determine the decision to remit.*

In the analysis that follows, I explain the dataset and the variables that I used to investigate these hypotheses. I then use a logistic regression to test the hypotheses and discuss the results.

### **Data**

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The data used is from the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) survey conducted by Rumbaut, et al. in 2004. IIMMLA is a part of a larger project that seeks to explore the incorporation of children of immigrants in the United States. The survey includes data from 1.5, 2<sup>nd</sup> and selected third-and-beyond generations of Mexicans, Vietnamese, Filipinos, Koreans, Chinese and Central Americans (Guatemalan and El Salvadoran). This survey is unique because it allows me explore the remittance behavior of 1.5 and 2<sup>nd</sup> generations<sup>5</sup>. Additionally, the data also includes demographic and household characteristics used by previous scholarship. Most importantly, the survey also offers questions that capture transnational ties, ties in the United States and civic engagement in the United States.

The IIMMLA survey covers five counties in the Los Angeles metropolitan area: Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura, Riverside and San Bernardino. The survey was conducted by telephone by multistage random sampling between April 28-October 11, 2004. The first stage was a cross-section sample using random digit dial (RDD) and the second stage sought to supplement the cross-section sample by using an RDD sampling of household restricted to high-density Asian population areas and using surname listings for Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese and Filipinos. The targeted sample was 1.5, 2<sup>nd</sup> and selected 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generation<sup>6</sup> adults aged 20-40.

The total sample was 4,655 respondents; however, data on remittance only extended to 1.5 and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation, thus, the sample size for this paper is 3,440 respondents. 1.5 generation respondents are defined as persons who came to live in the

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<sup>5</sup> While it would have been fruitful to explore remittance behavior beyond the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation, the IIMMLA survey only asked about remittance behavior for the 1.5 and 2<sup>nd</sup> generations.

<sup>6</sup> IIMMLA attempted to contact 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generation from as many ethnic subgroups as was practical. The end result was 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations included a sample primarily from the Mexican subgroup.

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United States prior to age 15. 2<sup>nd</sup> generation respondents are defined as persons who were born in the United States but have at least one parent born outside of the United States. Previous studies on first generation were group-specific and identified the behavior in specific national origin groups. My analysis is one of generation and not of specific groups, however, I do include national origin in my models. By not limiting my research to a national origin group, I hope that my findings can be generalizable to the children of immigrants. The IIMMLA is a regional survey, yet is relevant because contemporary immigrants settle in areas that are similar to the Los Angeles metropolitan area and may display the same characteristics as the respondents in this survey.

### **Models and Variables**

In order to analyze the characteristics of those who remit, I used a logistic regression analyses. The dependent variable is the decision to remit. The respondent is asked: *Did you ever send or give money to anyone living in your/your father's/your mother's/your parents' country of birth?* The independent variables used in the models include variables used by previous scholarship and I also included variables that measure civic engagement. I first ran the logistic regression including both the 1.5 and 2<sup>nd</sup> generations. This allowed me to explore which variables may be of significance for children of immigrants, generally. As stated earlier, socialization patterns for the generations differ and may effect the decision to remit, thus separate models were ran for each generation in order to capture these differences.

The models include five components: respondent demographics, respondent civic engagement in the US, respondent transnational ties and activities, respondent ties to the United States, and respondent national origin group. I included the demographic

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characteristics that have been shown to influence the decision to remit: age, education, gender and household income. In the first model, I also included a control variable for generation. Age and household income are continuous variables whereas gender, generation and education are categorical dummy variables. For education, the comparison group is those who had no high school education. Based on previous scholarship, I anticipate that education is a negative indicator while income is a positive indicator. While age has shown to be varying in significance, I anticipate that as age increases, the likelihood to remit will increase as well because as people age, it is likely that their income will rise as well. Younger respondents may not have the extra resources to allocate elsewhere whereas older respondents may. Furthermore, as respondents age, they may also take on more familial responsibilities, including sending remittances.

The variables of transnational ties and activities included are: group membership in the ancestral home, interest in politics of ancestral home, presence of relative(s) residing in ancestral home and number of times visited ancestral home. Respondents were asked: *Over the past twelve months, have you participated in any kind of organization which is associated with your your/your father's/your mother's/your parents' country of birth?* While it is not specified what is meant by participation, an affirmative answer to this suggests that the respondent may feel a sense of attachment to the ancestral country. The number of times that the respondent visited ancestral home was coded in groups of tens: 0-10 times were coded as one, 11-20 were given a value of two, 21-30 were given a value of three, 31-40 were given a value of four, 40+ was given a value of five. It was coded in this manner in order to capture the difference between few times, moderate number of times and the many times that a respondent visited the

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ancestral country. It is anticipated that the more visits to the ancestral country, the more likely it is that the children of immigrants will remit. These variables serve as a proxy for how emotionally tied the respondent is to the ancestral country, thus it is anticipated that the more ties the respondent has to the ancestral country, the likelihood to remit also increases.

In order to measure ties to the US, I included whether the respondent considers the US home, the respondent's preferred language and the presence of minors in the household. While considers US home and presence of minor are both dichotomous variables, the language preference is a categorical variable. The comparison group for preferred language is "Prefer Other language". This group is compared against those who "Prefer Both Languages", that is, they prefer the language of their parents and English equally and is also compared against those who "Prefer English." I included the presence of a minor in the model because this is an indication of a tie in the US that may deter the respondent to send money abroad. Additionally, having a minor present may also be a source of financial obligation in the US that restrains respondent's access to disposable income. These variables are intended to measure a sense of connection to the US. It is hypothesized that the more the 1.5 and 2<sup>nd</sup> generations establish a connection to the US, the less likely they are to remit.

To measure civic engagement, four items were used to construct an engagement index: membership in organization that influences policy, contacted a government office, attended political gatherings in support of a political candidate, and take part in any form of protest<sup>7</sup>. The index allows me to measure how many activities the respondent takes

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<sup>7</sup> Respondents were asked:

1. *Do you belong to any community organizations, work related organizations, sports teams, or other non-*

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part in rather than *which* activity influences the decision to remit. I also included a variable that asked the respondent if they understand current US politics. Understanding politics requires a time investment in order to be aware of current events and this investment indicates being engaged in the United States. As stated earlier, more civic engagement could reflect a sense of responsibility that may also translate to a familial responsibility and may increase the likelihood of remitting. On the other hand, more civic engagement can also be an indication of distant ties to the ancestral country and may decrease the likelihood to remit.

Pressure from parents has been shown to be influential on the decision to remit. While measuring whether or not the respondent has felt pressure could not be measured, I included whether or not the parents had sent money back while the respondent was growing up. It is likely that parents who had sent money back will exert pressure on their children to send money or that the children will emulate the behavior of their parent(s). Additionally, it is recognized that remittance behavior differs among national origin group among the first generation immigrants. Therefore, I included six major national origin groups that the data provided: Mexican, Salvadoran/Guatemalan, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese and Filipino. The comparison group for these six groups is white, non-Hispanics and black, non-Hispanics. I use this group as the comparison because they are

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*religious organizations?* This was followed up with: *Do any of the organizations you belong to get involved in or try to influence government or public policy?*

2. *In the past twelve months have you:*

*a. contacted a government office about a problem or to get help or information either by telephone, e-mail or in person?*

*b. attended any political meetings, rallies, speeches or dinners in support of a political candidate*

*c. taken part in any form of protest, such as picketing, a march, demonstration or boycott?*

IIMLA did include a question that asked if respondent voted in the CA special recall election. When I included the variable in the model, there were no significant differences and in the interest of preserving cases, I did not include this variable in my civic engagement index. Because it was a special election, turnout may not have been as high as in a general election, thus I felt that it was not as necessary to include this in the model.

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presumably not as likely to remit as the other groups and serve as a baseline for an indication of non-remittance behavior.

Descriptive statistics provided in Table 1 gives a broad overview of the sample means and standard deviations. From this table it can be seen that there is variation in the dependent and independent variables for those in the 1.5 generation as well as 2<sup>nd</sup> generation. Upon comparison of the dependent variable, I found that there was a statistically significant difference between the groups of remitting ( $p < 0.001$ ). Figure 1 shows the contrast between those in 1.5 generation and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation who remit. Almost 60% of those in the 1.5 generation report remitting while a 42% of those in the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation report remitting. Comparing the independent variables, I find that number of activities participated in US, language preference and the transnational ties variables are also statistically significant across groups.

**[Insert Table 1 approx. here]**

**[Insert Fig. 1 approx. here]**

### **Results and Discussion**

Table 2 presents the results for the sample of children of immigrants. Citizenship has been discussed in previous literature as increasing both the likelihood to remit as well as be politically active. However, in the analyses that follow, citizenship is not included because of the issues of collinearity with generation. The collinearity problem is attributed to the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation being citizens by default; however, it is recognized that not all of the 1.5 generation are citizens. I do not anticipate this to be problematic



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because the activities that are included to construct participation index do not require citizenship.

Table 2 shows the logistic regression for the whole sample. The variable of interest, number of activities participated in US indicates that the *more participatory* respondents are, the *more likely* they are to remit, accepting my first hypothesis and rejecting the second hypothesis. Furthermore, if parents had sent money, the likelihood the respondents also send money also increases. In order to interpret the results in a manner that is straightforward, Table 3 shows the change in predicted probabilities for the variables that are significant from Table 2. This table shows the difference from moving from the minimum value to the maximum value of the variable of interest while holding all other variables at their mean. From Table 3, it is seen that respondents who participated in all four activities were 16% more likely to remit than those who participate in none. These results indicate that civic engagement in the United States is not necessarily an impediment on the decision to send remittances. In fact, the more civic activities that the 1.5 and 2<sup>nd</sup> generations are involved in, the more likely they are to send money abroad. Additionally, understanding US politics has a weak effect on the decision to remit and those who claim to understand US politics are more 7% more likely to report they also send remittances. While neither of these variables is at a very strong significance level, the results show that one cannot discount the idea that involvement in the United States is mutually exclusive to the decision to send remittances.

**[Insert Table 2 approx. here]**

**[Insert Table 3 approx. here]**

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As mentioned, there is also an effect of familial obligations, as indicated by the 24% increase in the likelihood to remit among those who had parents who remitted. This result supports the first hypothesis that posits civic engagement and sending remittances can be an indication of having a sense of responsibility to society and to family. One who is responsible civically is more likely to be responsible to the family as well. As expected, having transnational ties increases one's likelihood of remitting although having an interest in the politics of the ancestral country has a weak significance. A possible explanation for the weak significance could be that the children of immigrants do not associate political issues with the act of remitting. This again, supports the responsibility hypothesis in remitting. On the other hand, the measures of assimilation into US society – considering US home and preferring English – decrease the likelihood to remit. This suggests that remitting among children of immigrants may not be a story of dual loyalties, but rather, loyalty to the parents.

The demographic variables are consistent with what past literature has shown – higher education has a negative effect whereas higher income has a positive effect. This result seems to be contradictory because those with higher education also have higher income. It is unclear what may account for this, however, a possible explanation for this could be that those who have achieved higher levels of education may not have perceived disposable income due to loans. I have also included generation cohort as a variable and my results indicate that 2<sup>nd</sup> generation respondents are 13% less likely to remit than 1.5 generation respondents.

Of the national origin groups, only Chinese and Koreans are less likely to remit. This could be a result of several factors including the wealth of the countries. Since these

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two countries have relative wealth, government policies may not offer incentives for these groups to remit. Thus, the parents of the children of immigrants did not remit and the practice had not been passed on. Interestingly, the results show no significance in the behavior of Mexicans and Salvadoran/Guatemalans. This could possibly be because these groups support their families in other ways other than sending money, such as sending clothes or basic necessities. However, the odds of remitting for Filipino increased by two when compared to the white, non-Hispanic and black, non-Hispanic. As previously stated, the experience of being a member of the 1.5 generation and the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation may result in different behaviors. Table 2 has shown that 2<sup>nd</sup> generation were less likely to remit, thus, the next question that I would like to address is, *“How do the characteristics of the 1.5 and 2<sup>nd</sup> generations who remit differ?”*

To answer this question, I separated the sample into 1.5 and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation and ran a logistic regression for each group. Since the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation may have been socialized into US society more so than those in the 1.5 generation who may not feel they “belong” to the US, I anticipate to find stronger significances between measures of transnational ties and likelihood to remit among the 1.5 generation. The 1.5 generation will more likely feel closer to the ancestral country than the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation. Since the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation may not have an emotional bond with the ancestral country, I also anticipate that they are more likely to value US civic engagement and more engagement will have a weaker effect on remitting. The results by generation are presented in Table 4 and the changes in predicted probabilities are presented in Table 5.

**[Insert Table 4 approx. here]**

**[Insert Table 5 approx. here]**

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Table 4 indicates that for both generations, the increased number of activities participated in the US continues to increase the likelihood to remit as it did in the full sample. As anticipated, this has a stronger significant effect for the 1.5 generation than for the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation and suggests that ties to the ancestral country weaken across generations. For this variable, those in the 1.5 generation who participate in all four activities are 19% more likely to remit than those who participate in none of the activities whereas this only increases the likelihood of remitting in the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation by 13%. Interestingly, understanding of US politics is only significant for the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation and increases the likelihood to remit by 8%. Furthermore, education level is only significant for the 1.5 generation and income has a stronger positive effect on the remittance behavior of the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation.

For both groups, considering US as home is significant and decreases the likelihood to remit. Additionally, for both groups, those who had parents who remitted increased the likelihood they would remit as well. The effect for both variables is equally strong for both groups. For the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation, the only transnational variables that have a significant effect on the decision to remit are having a relative in the ancestral country and number of times visited ancestral country. For the national origin groups, Vietnamese lose significance altogether in the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation. This was unexpected because of the relaxing policies that Vietnamese government has promoted. However, in the case of the Vietnamese, perhaps parents do not encourage their children to send money to support an oppressive regime that welcomes and takes uses the money for their own benefit. It is also surprising that Mexicans were not found to have a significant effect on likelihood to remit because presumably it would be easier for this group to send

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remittances due to the geographic distance of the ancestral country to the US. It is unclear why this is not the case, however, a possibility is that the relatively short distance to the ancestral country increases the likelihood to have family in the United States, thus decreasing the likelihood to send remittances.

In sum, the characteristics of those who remit in the 1.5 generation are similar to those in the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation, with the exception of understanding politics. However, for many variables, the significance level is weaker in the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation and may be an indication that remittances will decline with each generation. While it cannot be said conclusively that as ties to the ancestral country weaken, sending remittances will decrease, my results show that this may be the case.

### Conclusion

This paper sought to investigate whether remittances are able to “speak English.” I have shown that indeed, remittances *are* able to speak English – being civically engaged increased the odds of remitting. While it cannot be said that US civic engagement leads to remitting for the children of immigrants, my results do show that it is possible to take part in US society while continuing to support loved ones abroad – it is feasible to be an active member in the United States while aiding the development of another country. In short, partaking in US society does not preclude sending remittances.

Other countries depend on remittances for local industry and economic development. More importantly, individual families depend on remittances for sustenance and livelihood. Overall, remittances have a positive effect on the receiving country. As the US economy worsens, the flow of remittances is expected to decrease (Ratha, et al., 2008), an indication that concern for the US outweighs the propensity to

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send remittances. However, to fully explain remittance behavior in the later generations, it is necessary to explore the motivations and frequency of this behavior. Additionally, longitudinal data will allow scholars to explore the sustainability of remitting.

Unfortunately, the IIMMLA does not provide researchers with such insight; however, it does offer a starting point in the investigation of remittance behavior for children of immigrants and, more importantly, their broader transnational behaviors.

While the IIMMLA does have its limitations, the contributions of this survey cannot be overlooked. From the IIMMLA, scholars are able to examine the scope of transnational behaviors of children of immigrants. These children are reaching maturity and are moving from adolescence to adulthood. As these children make this transition, they have potential to play an important role both here and abroad. Moreover, the children of immigrants provide a link from the ancestral home to the United States and contribute to the cultural flow leading to increased diversity and tolerance in the United States. Further exploration of the sustainability of these behaviors may preview what is to come if later generations no longer provide this link.

Secondly, the IIMMLA allows researchers to make cross-racial comparisons. Transnational behaviors may vary across national origin groups and this data allows researchers to disentangle these nuances. My research has shown that some groups are more likely to remit than others and further research should be conducted to investigate differences in other transnational behaviors across national origin groups. Findings from such research can help scholars better understand motivations for groups to be transnational.

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Finally, the IIMMLA provides an inception to the process of deciphering the relationship between transnational behavior and involvement in US civic life. Understanding this relationship will help scholars to refine what it means to be transnational and uncover yet another layer of minority assimilation and political incorporation. Though this data offers a only a glimpse of the full picture, it can be cautiously said that partaking in transnational activities is not a barrier that separates “good citizens” from “bad citizens.” To conclude, participating in transnational activities is not a definitive indication of a tug-of-war over loyalties to the ancestral home and loyalties to the US – these loyalties need not be divided.

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
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**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, 1.5 Generation and 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation**

|  | 1.5 Generation |             |                 | 2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation |             |                 |
|--|----------------|-------------|-----------------|----------------------------|-------------|-----------------|
|  | <i>Obs</i>     | <i>Mean</i> | <i>Std. Dev</i> | <i>Obs</i>                 | <i>Mean</i> | <i>Std. Dev</i> |
| <b>Dependent Variable</b>                              |                |             |                 |                            |             |                 |
| Send Remittances***                                    | 1619           | 0.40        | 0.49            | 1817                       | 0.26        | 0.44            |
| <b>Independent Variables</b>                           |                |             |                 |                            |             |                 |
| Female   | 1622           | 0.50        | 0.50            | 1818                       | 0.51        | 0.50            |
| Age***   | 1622           | 28.83       | 6.07            | 1818                       | 27.06       | 5.82            |
| High School  | 1620           | 0.16        | 0.36            | 1817                       | 0.18        | 0.38            |
| Trade or Vocational School                             | 1620           | 0.02        | 0.16            | 1817                       | 0.04        | 0.19            |
| College graduate**                                     | 1620           | 0.30        | 0.46            | 1817                       | 0.26        | 0.44            |
| Graduate School**                                      | 1620           | 0.12        | 0.33            | 1817                       | 0.10        | 0.30            |
| Household Income                                       | 1531           | 52.08       | 30.90           | 1691                       | 53.96       | 29.99           |
| <i>US Engagement</i>                                   |                |             |                 |                            |             |                 |
| Understand US politics                                 | 1621           | 0.86        | 0.35            | 1818                       | 0.88        | 0.33            |
| Number of activities participated in US**              | 1617           | 0.49        | 0.76            | 1817                       | 0.57        | 0.81            |
| <i>US Ties</i>   |                |             |                 |                            |             |                 |
| Consider US home**                                     | 1622           | 0.93        | 0.25            | 1818                       | 0.96        | 0.20            |
| Minor present in Household                             | 1622           | 0.53        | 0.50            | 1818                       | 0.50        | 0.50            |
| Prefer Two Languages***                                | 1490           | 0.16        | 0.36            | 1356                       | 0.10        | 0.30            |
| Prefer English***                                      | 1490           | 0.48        | 0.50            | 1356                       | 0.66        | 0.47            |
| <i>Familial Obligations</i>                            |                |             |                 |                            |             |                 |
| Parents remit***                                       | 1517           | 0.68        | 0.47            | 1700                       | 0.60        | 0.49            |
| <i>Transnational Ties</i>                              |                |             |                 |                            |             |                 |
| Belong to a group involved with parent's home country* | 1622           | 0.07        | 0.26            | 1817                       | 0.09        | 0.29            |
| Interest in politics of parent's home country*         | 1571           | 0.60        | 0.49            | 1807                       | 0.63        | 0.48            |
| Relative living in parent's home country***            | 1602           | 0.86        | 0.35            | 1785                       | 0.76        | 0.43            |
| Times respondent has gone to parent's home country     | 1611           | 0.68        | 0.63            | 1814                       | 0.66        | 0.77            |
| <i>National Origin Group</i>                           |                |             |                 |                            |             |                 |
| Mexican***   | 1622           | 0.18        | 0.38            | 1818                       | 0.30        | 0.46            |
| Salvadoran/Guatemalan                                  | 1622           | 0.11        | 0.31            | 1818                       | 0.11        | 0.31            |
| Other Latin American*                                  | 1622           | 0.05        | 0.21            | 1818                       | 0.06        | 0.24            |
| Chinese***   | 1622           | 0.14        | 0.34            | 1818                       | 0.10        | 0.30            |
| Korean***  | 1622           | 0.16        | 0.36            | 1818                       | 0.08        | 0.27            |
| Vietnamese***  | 1622           | 0.17        | 0.38            | 1818                       | 0.06        | 0.25            |
| Filipino   | 1622           | 0.12        | 0.32            | 1818                       | 0.12        | 0.32            |
| Other Asian  | 1622           | 0.02        | 0.16            | 1818                       | 0.03        | 0.17            |
| Valid N (listwise)                                     | 1266           |             |                 | 1163                       |             |                 |

Note: Tested for statistically significant differences between 1.5 Generation and 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation  
 \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001

Figure 1: Percentage of those who remit by Generation



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**Table 2: Logistic Regression of Decision to Remit, 1.5 Generation and 2<sup>nd</sup> Generations**

| Independent Variables                                 | <i>b</i> | <i>Std. Error</i> | <i>Odds ratio</i>         |
|---|----------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>Demographics</i>                                   |          |                   |                           |
| Female  | 0.1079   | 0.0970            | 1.1140                    |
| Age   | 0.0015   | 0.0094            | 1.0015                    |
| High School <sup>1</sup>                              | 0.1392   | 0.1369            | 1.1493                    |
| Trade or Vocational School                            | 0.0633   | 0.2543            | 1.0654                    |
| College graduate                                      | -0.2501  | 0.1269            | <b>0.7787<sup>†</sup></b> |
| Graduate School                                       | -0.3773  | 0.1849            | <b>0.6857<sup>†</sup></b> |
| Household Income                                      | 0.0040   | 0.0018            | <b>1.0040<sup>†</sup></b> |
| 2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation                            | -0.5876  | 0.1045            | <b>0.5557***</b>          |
| <i>US Engagement</i>                                  |          |                   |                           |
| Understand US politics                                | 0.3372   | 0.1508            | <b>1.4010<sup>†</sup></b> |
| Number of activities participated in US               | 0.1767   | 0.0622            | <b>1.1933**</b>           |
| <i>US Ties</i>  |          |                   |                           |
| Consider US home                                      | -0.7219  | 0.2066            | <b>0.4858***</b>          |
| Minor present in Household                            | -0.0682  | 0.1036            | 0.9341                    |
| Prefer Two Languages <sup>2</sup>                     | -0.1481  | 0.1570            | 0.8623                    |
| Prefer English  | -0.6451  | 0.1120            | <b>0.5246***</b>          |
| <i>Familial Obligations</i>                           |          |                   |                           |
| Parents remit   | 1.2073   | 0.1179            | <b>3.3444***</b>          |
| <i>Transnational Ties</i>                             |          |                   |                           |
| Belong to a group involved with parent's home country | 0.4712   | 0.1712            | <b>1.6020**</b>           |
| Interest in politics of parent's home country         | 0.1652   | 0.1023            | <b>1.1796<sup>†</sup></b> |
| Relative living in parent's home country              | 0.7140   | 0.1501            | <b>2.0422***</b>          |
| Times respondent has gone to parent's home country    | 0.3096   | 0.0701            | <b>1.3629***</b>          |
| <i>National Origin Group<sup>3</sup></i>              |          |                   |                           |
| Mexican   | 0.2767   | 0.2393            | 1.3188                    |
| Salvadoran/Guatemalan                                 | 0.3087   | 0.2539            | 1.3616                    |
| Other Latin American                                  | 0.0823   | 0.2856            | 1.0858                    |
| Chinese   | -0.8357  | 0.2693            | <b>0.4336**</b>           |
| Korean  | -1.0184  | 0.2722            | <b>0.3612***</b>          |
| Vietnamese  | 0.4758   | 0.2524            | <b>1.6094*</b>            |
| Filipino  | 0.6970   | 0.2711            | <b>2.0076**</b>           |
| Other Asian   | 0.2296   | 0.3493            | 1.2582                    |
| Total Cases   |          | 2429              |                           |
| Log likelihood  |          | -1334.908         |                           |
| Chi-Square  |          | <b>530.61***</b>  |                           |
| Predicted Correctly                                   |          | 70.61             |                           |

†p<0.10, \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001

<sup>1</sup>No high school is the comparison group for all education variables

<sup>2</sup> Prefer other language is the comparison group for language preference variables

<sup>3</sup> White, non-Hispanic and black, non-Hispanic is the comparison group for all national origin variables

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**Table 3: Changes in predicted Probabilities, both generations<sup>1</sup>**

| Independent Variables                                 | Sample |
|---|--------|
| College graduate                                      | -0.05  |
| Graduate School                                       | -0.08  |
| Household Income                                      | 0.08   |
| 2nd Generation  | -0.13  |
| Understand US politics                                | 0.07   |
| Number of activities participated in US               | 0.16   |
| Consider US home                                      | -0.17  |
| Prefer English  | -0.14  |
| Parents remit   | 0.24   |
| Belong to a group involved with parent's home country | 0.11   |
| Interest in politics of parent's home country         | 0.04   |
| Relative living in parent's home country              | 0.14   |
| Times respondent has gone to parent's home country    | 0.37   |

<sup>1</sup> Reports the average change across respondents in the probability of remitting when the independent variable of interest is moved from its minimum value to maximum value, holding all other independent variables at their means.

Table 4: Logistic Regression of Decision to Remit, Generational Comparison

| Independent Variables                                 | 1.5 Generation   |           |                           | 2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation |           |                           |
|---|------------------|-----------|---------------------------|----------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|
|   | <i>b</i>         | <i>SE</i> | OR                        | <i>b</i>                   | <i>SE</i> | OR                        |
| <i>Demographics</i>                                   |                  |           |                           |                            |           |                           |
| Female  | 0.0752           | 0.1302    | 1.0781                    | 0.1706                     | 0.1485    | 1.1860                    |
| Age   | 0.0044           | 0.0124    | 1.0044                    | 0.0005                     | 0.0149    | 1.0005                    |
| High School <sup>1</sup>                              | 0.1006           | 0.1923    | 1.1058                    | 0.2024                     | 0.1992    | 1.2244                    |
| Trade or Vocational School                            | -0.0446          | 0.4094    | 0.9564                    | 0.1915                     | 0.3306    | 1.2111                    |
| College graduate                                      | -0.5127          | 0.1722    | <b>0.5989**</b>           | 0.0851                     | 0.1906    | 1.0888                    |
| Graduate School                                       | -0.5072          | 0.2418    | <b>0.6022*</b>            | -0.3097                    | 0.2974    | 0.7337                    |
| Household Income                                      | 0.0036           | 0.0025    | <b>1.0036<sup>†</sup></b> | 0.0052                     | 0.0027    | <b>1.0052*</b>            |
| <i>US Engagement</i>                                  |                  |           |                           |                            |           |                           |
| Understand US politics                                | 0.2240           | 0.1992    | 1.2510                    | 0.4949                     | 0.2373    | <b>1.6403*</b>            |
| Number of activities participated in US               | 0.1962           | 0.0867    | <b>1.2168*</b>            | 0.1610                     | 0.0906    | <b>1.1747<sup>†</sup></b> |
| <i>US Ties</i>  |                  |           |                           |                            |           |                           |
| Consider US home                                      | -0.6288          | 0.2629    | <b>0.5332**</b>           | -0.8451                    | 0.3390    | <b>0.4295**</b>           |
| Minor present in Household                            | -0.0368          | 0.1417    | 0.9639                    | -0.0862                    | 0.1545    | 0.9174                    |
| Prefer Two Languages <sup>2</sup>                     | -0.0688          | 0.1975    | 0.9336                    | -0.2870                    | 0.2678    | 0.7505                    |
| Prefer English  | -0.6486          | 0.1504    | <b>0.5228***</b>          | -0.6243                    | 0.1723    | <b>0.5356***</b>          |
| <i>Familial Obligations</i>                           |                  |           |                           |                            |           |                           |
| Parents remit   | 1.1726           | 0.1560    | <b>3.2303***</b>          | 1.2911                     | 0.1873    | <b>3.6369***</b>          |
| <i>Transnational Ties</i>                             |                  |           |                           |                            |           |                           |
| Belong to a group involved with parent's home country | 0.6660           | 0.2495    | <b>1.9465**</b>           | 0.2914                     | 0.2414    | 1.3383                    |
| Interest in politics of parent's home country         | 0.1482           | 0.1366    | 1.1598                    | 0.1784                     | 0.1576    | 1.1953                    |
| Relative living in parent's home country              | 0.5866           | 0.2105    | <b>1.7979**</b>           | 0.7889                     | 0.2205    | <b>2.2010***</b>          |
| Times respondent has gone to parent's home country    | 0.2903           | 0.1086    | <b>1.3368**</b>           | 0.3317                     | 0.0941    | <b>1.3934***</b>          |
| <i>National Origin Group<sup>3</sup></i>              |                  |           |                           |                            |           |                           |
| Mexican   | 0.4207           | 0.3462    | 1.5230                    | 0.1412                     | 0.3368    | 1.1516                    |
| Salvadoran/Guatemalan                                 | 0.3291           | 0.3579    | 1.3898                    | 0.2419                     | 0.3658    | 1.2736                    |
| Other Latin American                                  | -0.0244          | 0.4067    | 0.9759                    | 0.0912                     | 0.4054    | 1.0955                    |
| Chinese   | -0.6149          | 0.3573    | <b>0.5407<sup>†</sup></b> | -1.1663                    | 0.4311    | <b>0.3115**</b>           |
| Korean  | -0.8542          | 0.3511    | <b>0.4256**</b>           | -1.3346                    | 0.4877    | <b>0.2633**</b>           |
| Vietnamese  | 0.5067           | 0.3374    | <b>1.6598<sup>†</sup></b> | 0.5061                     | 0.4056    | 1.6589                    |
| Filipino  | 0.6809           | 0.3609    | <b>1.9757*</b>            | 0.7686                     | 0.4239    | <b>2.1567*</b>            |
| Other Asian   | 0.0707           | 0.5231    | 1.0732                    | 0.2698                     | 0.4810    | 1.3097                    |
| <hr/>   |                  |           |                           |                            |           |                           |
| Total Cases   | 1266             |           |                           | 1163                       |           |                           |
| Log likelihood  | -732.10287       |           |                           | -595.1998                  |           |                           |
| Chi-Square  | <b>264.01***</b> |           |                           | <b>243.93***</b>           |           |                           |
| Predicted Correctly                                   | 68.17            |           |                           | 72.31                      |           |                           |

<sup>†</sup>p<0.10, \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001

<sup>1</sup>No high school is the comparison group for all education variables

<sup>2</sup>Prefer other language is the comparison group for language preference variables



<sup>3</sup> White, non-Hispanic and black, non-Hispanic is the comparison group for all national origin variables

**Table 5: Changes in predicted probabilities, by generation**

| Independent Variables                                 | 1.5 gen | 2nd gen |
|---|---------|---------|
| College graduate                                      | -0.12   | --      |
| Graduate School                                       | -0.12   | --      |
| Household Income                                      | 0.08    | 0.09    |
| Understand US politics                                | --      | 0.08    |
| Number of activities participated in US               | 0.19    | 0.13    |
| Consider US home                                      | -0.16   | -0.18   |
| Prefer English  | 0.15    | -0.12   |
| Parents remit   | 0.26    | 0.22    |
|   |         |         |
| Belong to a group involved with parent's home country | 0.16    | --      |
| Relative living in parent's home country              | 0.13    | 0.13    |
|   |         |         |
| Times respondent has gone to parent's home country    | 0.34    | 0.37    |
| Chinese   | -0.14   | -0.17   |
| Korean  | -0.19   | -0.18   |
| Vietnamese  | 0.12    | --      |
| Filipino  | 0.12    | 0.16    |

<sup>1</sup> Reports the average change across respondents in the probability of remitting when the independent variable of interest is moved from its minimum value to maximum value, holding all other independent variables at their means.