How 'Democratic' is the Democratic Peace?

A Survey Experiment of Foreign Policy Preferences in Brazil and China

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Abstract

Researchers have begun to use survey experiments to analyze international relations. In a recent study, Tomz and Weeks (2013*b*) find that British and American respondents are less willing to use force against fellow democracies than against non-democracies. While these results are indicative, it is essential to determine whether attitudes favoring peace with democratic opponents extend to publics in dissimilar societies and whether democratic and non-democratic citizens differ in their willingness to advocate war against democratic targets. We conduct survey experiments in two carefully chosen non-western countries—China and Brazil—to assess the scope of popular preferences for peace with democracies. Our survey randomly varies both the hypothetical target's regime type and authorization by the United Nations for military action, responding to concerns that regime labels may trigger unintended value judgements about the target's legitimacy. Our results show that respondents in both Brazil and China are significantly less likely to favor attacking a democratic opponent. At the same time, UN authorization has a much larger effect on a respondent's support for using force.

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Introduction

Students of politics have devoted enormous attention to exploring the role that domestic publics play in formulating foreign policy. Evidence of the impact of public opinion has been difficult to unearth, however, and tests often rely as much on plausible assumptions and good faith interpretation as on robust causal inferences. Given these difficulties, researchers have begun to apply experimental techniques to assist them in better understanding relationships.

In a clever recent example, Tomz and Weeks (2013*b*) demonstrate experimentally that subjects in the United States and the United Kingdom are less willing to advocate attacks against democracies than against non-democratic countries. Popular preferences might thus account for the democratic peace—the observation that democracies seldom fight each other.

Yet while experimental methods are capable of establishing strong causal linkages, ambiguity persists both in interpreting results and in connecting individual-level findings to macro-level processes. For example, it is not clear what asking citizens in a democracy whether they are willing to go to war with another democratic country means either for democratic foreign policy making or for differences between democracies and non-democracies in how they conduct international affairs. Much remains before researchers can confidently tie findings about a subject's stated preferences for peace with a "democracy" to patterns of conflict involving liberal republics. A critical next step, as Tomz and Weeks point out, is to determine the generalizability of the linkage between public opinion, regime type, and war.

How 'democratic' are popular preferences for peace with liberal states? Explanations for the democratic peace must account for a common tendency among democracies that does not exist among non-democracies. The United States and the United Kingdom are atypical, even "exceptional" nations in a number of ways, possessing wealth, power, status and closely linked histories and cultures. The foreign policy attitudes of citizens in these two Anglo democracies might prove equally exceptional, failing to manifest in other democracies.

Public preferences for peace with democracies could also prove to be *excessively* popular. The democratic peace consists of a special level of cooperation unique among democracies. To explain this difference directly using public opinion, subjects in non-democracies should advocate war with democracies at least as often as with non-democracies. If instead populations under non-democratic rule share an affinity for peace with democracies, then additional factors are needed to match the liberal peace. Citizens in different societies may differ in how they characterize democracy. Alternately, heterogeneous institutions may mediate between the public will and international affairs. Either way, role of popular preferences in producing the democratic peace, and in fomenting foreign policy, would then need to be re-assessed.

We conduct survey experiments in Brazil and China to assess the generalizability of the relationship between public opinion and the democratic peace. These two countries were chosen with considerable care. Each nation is a rising regional power, capable of acting aggressively against its neighbors if it so chooses. Using military force is thus more than a mere abstraction for publics in either country. At the same time, each country's interests are in some tension with the global status quo; questions about the use of force are unlikely to be confused in the public mind with hegemonic leadership or acting "as the world's policeman."

China is a non-democracy. The democratic peace highlights critical differences in the foreign policy behaviors of democratic and non-democratic states. It is clearly problematic to assess explanations for such differences without considering both democracies and non-democracies. Brazil is a developing democracy, exhibiting key differences from established, western states. Support for democracy is relatively low in Brazil—in some surveys, fewer than half of respondents identify democracy as the best form of government. These cases thus provide critical variance in regime type, development, status and culture needed to evaluate the 'democraticness' of the link between public opinion and the democratic peace.

A second concern has to do with the meaning of democracy. Publics may imbue this complex and evocative concept with content that researchers ignore at their peril. It is

possible, for example, that "democracy" may be read by subjects as coded language for a "good," "friendly" or "responsible" country. To find out, we included a second experimental variable in our survey. Subjects were randomly informed that the United Nations either had, or had not, authorized using force against a target nation. While only an initial step in determining how subjects perceive democracy, this treatment for UN approval helps to assess and control for the possibility that democracy as a label acts as an authoritative cue.

As it turns out, the public preference for peace with democracies is more widespread than many might have imagined. Respondents from both Brazil and China were significantly less likely to endorse military violence against a state when it was randomly identified as a democracy in our experiment. However, United Nations authorization - or a lack thereof - proved much more important substantively in predicting public preferences for using force.

After reviewing relevant literatures, we detail the need to look more broadly in assessing the connection between public opinion and the democratic peace. We then discuss details of our experimental research design and present the results from the Brazilian and Chinese samples. We conclude by reviewing implications of our findings for democratic peace theory.

Literature: Democracy and Peace

The literature on the democratic peace is voluminous, though it has proven strangely difficult to develop a consensus explanation for why pairs of democracies seldom fight each other.

Democracies are much more peaceful with each other than other pairings of states, though they are about as war prone as other regimes in general (Russett and Oneal 2001).[1] This implies that democratic dyads are the most cooperative, followed by non-democratic dyads, and that mixed dyads (democracy and non-democracy) are the most conflictual (c.f., Bennett

[1]Some debate exists about whether democracies are generally less warlike, though even advocates admit that this is a weaker relationship (Benoit 1996; Chan 1984; Ray 2001; Rousseau et al. 1996; Rummel 1996).

2006). Babst (1964; 1972) is first to identify the dyadic relationship. Small and Singer (1976) and Rummel (1979; 1983; 1985) develop the empirical observation, while Doyle (1983*a*; 1983*b*; 1997) and Levy (1988) shape theoretical perspectives and identify the "lawlike" observation. A vast body of work documents the statistically significant reduction in conflict in democratic dyads (c.f., Beck et al. 1998; Bremer 1992, 1993; Gibler and Hutchinson 2013; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Hensel et al. 2000; Hermann and Kegley 1995, 1997; Huth and Allee 2002, 2003; Maoz and Abdoladi 1989; Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993; Mitchell 1997; Oneal et al. 1996, 2003; Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999a, 1999b; Ray 1995; Russett 1993; Senese 1997).[2]

Charles Lipson may have described the democratic peace best when he quipped that, "We know it works in practice. Now we have to see if it works in theory!" (Lipson, 2005, page 1). Initial explanations focused on linkages between domestic political attributes and observed reductions in the use of force. Institutionalists argue that representation, deliberation, and civilian bureaucracy inhibit military violence (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993). Kant (1972) saw constitutional constraints as restraining the sovereign's innate proclivity to make war. Norms explanations assign an analogous role to democratic culture (Dixon 1993, 1994; Ember et al. 1992; Mintz and Geva 1993; Owen 1994, 1997; Russett 1993).[3] Constructivists claim that force in the international system is becoming socially unacceptable (Cederman 2001a, 2001b; Cederman and Rao 2001; Mueller 1989; Risse-Kappen 1995, 1997; Wendt 1999). Some see the evolution of a common community or identity (Deutsch 1978; Flynn and Farrell 1999). Others assert that

[2]Critics of the democratic peace challenge its statistical validity (Spiro 1994), cultural bias (Henderson 1998), or generalizability (Henderson 2002). Others offer alternatives, including alliances (Gowa 1994, 1995), the Cold War (Farber and Gowa 1995; Gowa 1999), or satisfaction (Kacowicz 1995; Lemke and Reed 1996).

[3]Old democratic dyads appear as dispute prone as new dyads (Enterline 1998; Ward and Gleditsch 1998).

mature democracies fail to fight states they perceive as democratic (Weart 1994, 1998).[4]

These constraint theories have been criticized as *ad hoc* and deductively flawed (Layne 1994; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999; Gates, et al. 1996; Rosato 2003). Efforts to avoid a circularity between theory and evidence benefit most from the development of new empirical content (Huth and Allee 2003). Work by Mousseau (2000), Hegre (2000), and Mousseau et al. (2003), for example, limits the democratic peace to states with advanced industrialized economies. It is not obvious why norms, institutions, or other factors would inhibit conflict among rich democracies but fail to do so for poor democratic states. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) argues that leaders in societies with small winning coalitions (autocracies) can efficiently target international opponents through limited force, while leaders facing big winning coalitions (democracies) are better off fighting harder, or not at all. Democratic dyads promise particularly expensive contests, leading leaders to prefer negotiated settlements.

Another explanation for the democratic peace rests on unique informational characteristics of democracies. Several authors view democracies as more transparent (Small 1996; Vanbelle 1997; Mitchell 1998). Others argue that "audience costs" or opposition groups allow democracies better to signal resolve (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998, 1999; Smith 1998). Properly understood, however, these explanations anticipate monadic democratic pacifism, not the dyadic democratic peace relationship. Contests should be less likely in all dyads possessing at least *one* democratic state, regardless of the regime type of the dyadic partner.

Recent efforts seek to apply public opinion research to the democratic peace. Tomz and Weeks (2013*b*) report a survey experiment of public attitudes toward military violence among US and British citizens. Subjects were asked to consider whether or not their country should use force in a hypothetical international crisis. The study finds a consistent treatment effect

[4]Liberal leaders or voters may potentially downplay the "democraticness" of enemy regimes in order to allow themselves to pursue Realpolitik with fewer normative concerns (Oren 1995).

for democracy; subjects are significantly less likely to support attacks against a democracy.

In a follow-up study, Tomz and Weeks (2013*a*) find that normative concerns separable from democracy matter much more than regime type in explaining popular approval for the use of force. Their survey experiment, again using samples from the United States and the United Kingdom, shows that the pacifying effect of a treatment for whether the target country supports human rights subsumes the effect of the treatment for democracy.

Evidence that citizens care more about whether a hypothetical target is humanistic than democratic suggests a role for social affinity, more than regime type. Common preferences may lie behind the democratic peace, rather than liberal institutions. The term "democracy" may also have important socially constructed connotations for respondents, reflecting subjective normative "goods" in addition to a nation's actual political attributes. Subjects could conceivably pay much less attention to political science definitions of democracy than to intuitive notions of similarity or difference, at the cultural, national or individual level.

The notion that democratic peace can be explained by elite or popular affinities is appealing given logical parsimony (Faber and Gowa 1997). If democratic citizens or their leaders "like" each other, then this could account for the democratic peace observation, without requiring an elaborate theory to generate the special dyadic nature of the relationship. However, the risk in such an explanation is that it again tends toward tautology, given that the absence of war among societies is an important indication of affinity. The proper way forward, then, is to assess cases where affinities are not inherent or obvious. If the democratic peace works by creating affinities among democracies—rather than by states that "like" each other happening also to be democracies—then non-status quo powers with the capabilities to attempt to coerce change if necessary) that *are* democratic, should behave differently from dissatisfied, rising powers that are non-democracies. We explore this possibility below.

Theory: Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace

The democratic peace is an observation about how pairs of democracies differ in their foreign policies from other combinations of states. It follows that explaining the democratic peace most likely involves identifying differences between democracies and non-democracies. If public opinion differs systematically between citizens in democracies and non-democracies, then this would be evidence that public attitudes may be critical to the democratic peace.

More generally, while "micro" evidence of a link between public opinion and a preference for peace toward democracies—at least in some countries—is provocative and interesting, much remains to be done to tie this finding to "macro" evidence of dyadic variation in conflict. The democratic peace is a global phenomenon, requiring evidence that the impact of public opinion on foreign policy spans many, if not most, democracies. While Tomz and Weeks (2013*b*) argue that their results are generalizable "to countries with varying attitudes about military action" (p. 860), it is difficult to conclude this from their sample. The United States and the United Kingdom are consolidated, wealthy democracies that enjoy privileged international status and whose citizens have been habituated to interventions abroad. Few countries are more alike, and at the same time are less like other nations in so many respects. The bulk of democracies are younger, poorer, and lack a long history of political stability. Many confront ongoing disputes over borders, resources, and face important gaps in human and national security that go unquestioned by citizens in developed parts of the globe.

Given *prima facie* claims of Anglo exceptionalism (c.f., Lipset 1996), it may be prudent to evaluate the scope of the relationship between public opinion and the democratic peace, rather than simply assuming that observed relationships are general. Indeed, the very nature of the democratic peace requires some circumspection, since for public opinion to conform to the macro observation, democratic publics must typically prefer peace with other democracies, while non–democratic publics *must not* prefer peace with democracies.

At the same time that publics in developing democracies could conceivably fail to favor democracies with peace, populations of non-democratic states may fail *not* to favor democracies. The nature of popular preferences under a non-democratic regime is interesting in its own right. However, the democratic peace relies on important differences between how democracies and non-democracies interact. If popular attitudes about the use of force look similar regardless of regime type, then public opinion alone is not adequate to explain the democratic peace. Of course, public attitudes about the use of force may matter much less in autocracies, but this returns the focus of research to institutional differences across regime type, rather than imagining that public opinion alone accounts for the democratic peace.

Imagine that publics everywhere prefer not to fight democracies. The aggregate effect of this would be what is generally termed democratic pacifism; democracies should appear less likely to experience conflict with any adversary, democratic or non-democratic. Imagine instead that publics generally oppose attacking democratic adversaries, but that elites in autocracies do not share this view, while democratic leaders must listen to popular preferences. This finding would match the democratic peace. However, the critical causal variable would be the way that regimes differ in their attentiveness to public opinion, in a word their institutional structure, an explanation that has long existed for the democratic peace. Public opinion would then be no more a causal variable (since it would not vary) than how realists used to treat international anarchy. Public preferences for democratic peace might be labeled a "permissive condition," but it would not be causal. Finally, it is also possible that only publics in democracies are partial to peace with other democracies. This would fit the democratic peace proposition without requiring the inclusion of other causal variables.

Finally, it is unclear how subjects actually interpret the treatments deployed by Tomz and Weeks (2013*b*). While academics have learned to use terms like "democracy" with considerable analytical precision, it does not follow that survey respondents have in mind the Freedom House definition, say, or even that they employ heuristics like elections or

constraints on executive action. As we have already suggested, democracy may simply serve as a convenient proxy for things respondents deem to be good or similar to themselves or their nation. Subjects may treat the researcher's use of the term as an authoritative cue that force is unwarranted, and that recommending military action will be frowned upon. Subjects may also view the approval of international institutions as an important mechanism for assessing the legitimacy of proposed uses of force, as suggested by several sources in the literature.

Just as "princely virtues" were once presented as the standard by which the behavior of political leaders was to be evaluated—even though very few princes actually exhibited these virtues—so too "democracy" has now come to represent a broad and amorphous set of desirable national qualities. Almost every country claims to be a democracy, even those that clearly do not qualify by any reasonable definition. At the same time, enemies are capable of misrepresenting regime type. Saddam Hussein and Fidel Castro each claimed that their regimes were democratic, and each questioned the extent of democracy present in the United States. Symbolic or socially constructed effects of democracy as a label are bound to be accentuated in samples of respondents from status quo powers, where a country's virtues will tend to be associated with its reluctance to rock the international boat. Rather than capturing the effect of political democracy on the willingness of subjects to advocate war, experimental research may actually be measuring whether the hypothetical opponent is perceived to be in good standing with the international order, or is even hostile or friendly.

While it remains difficult to actually enter the minds of respondents, a partial solution may derive from evidence that international institutions help to shape public preferences involving the use of force. It may be that domestic publics respond affirmatively to signals from international sources that their leader has chosen moderate or competent policies (Chapman 2011; Grieco et al. 2011). An international resolution also serves as a commitment mechanism, encouraging domestic publics to "rally round the flag" and possibly causing foreign publics to advocate greater caution from their own governments (Thompson 2006). Interna-

tional institutional approval further implies more extensive support and lower costs for the state or coalition in exercising force, making contests more palatable to domestic publics.

As with any other analytical framework, the risk in survey experiments is that subjects are responding as best they can to conditions and concepts that do not perfectly confirm to their reality. Without other options, subjects may imagine that the researcher herself has expectations about what is the normatively "correct" answer. Subjects that are told that a country is a democracy may infer that this country follows international rules more often, or that it reflects values more akin to the global status quo, even if these properties are not necessarily attributes of democracy. Conversely, further disaggregating public opinion by international approval and domestic regime type has the potential of demonstrating whether public support for the use of force is more dependent on one mechanism or the other, or both, or neither. Research on international institutions has emphasized the role of the United Nations in particular as a mechanism for peace. Yet, evidence of the pacific effect of international institutions has been difficult to unearth. We surmise that UN approval is a separate, but related attribute of public opinion that must be separated from support for democracy in understanding the effects of popular preferences on foreign policy.

Previous attempts to tie public opinion to the democratic peace have not considered that this relationship may be mediated through international institutions, or that "democracy" itself may be interpreted by subjects as a cue of authoritative (dis)approval for advocating the exercise of military violence. Combined with the specificity and atypical nature of the samples used in previous studies, the danger is that the impact of popular preferences is either too exceptional or too general to conform to the dyadic macro observation that democracies do not fight each other, while other combinations of regimes continue to confront each other through force. We explored these possibilities in the survey experiment detailed below.

Experimental Design

The ideal experiment on public opinion and the democratic peace would measure the support of subjects for their government's use of force against every country. An opponent's regime type would be randomly assigned and each country would face identical scenarios and geopolitical contexts. Our resources are too limited to survey every country, and each country faces unique security environments that no doubt affect public perspectives (compare, for example, Iceland and Israel). However, we believe that careful case selection and an experimental design that decontextualized security threats helps to advance the literature.

Our study consists of survey experiments conducted in China and Brazil. As with previous work (Tomz and Weeks, 2013*b*), we use internet-based polling. Subjects in each country were asked to read short scenarios ("vignettes") about potential conflicts involving two hypothetical countries ("A" and "B"), and express their support for the use of force. Two treatments were randomly assigned: the regime type of Country B and UN authorization for Country A's use of force.

Our survey used the following format. The script was translated into the local language.[5] Prior to reading the script, subjects were advised that the scenario is hypothetical and should not be read as if it referred to any particular country:

> *A country in the same part of the world as Country A is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. This country (Country B) could then threaten other countries in the region with possible nuclear attack. Country A has attempted to resolve the situation peacefully, but Country B refuses to stop or even discuss the issue. Additional information: Country A would almost certainly defeat Country B in a military dispute. If Country B*

[5]To assess quality/consistency, different translators re-translated each translation back into English.

acquires nuclear weapons, it will have the power to blackmail or destroy other countries. Country B is [not] a democracy. If Country A attacks, it will be able to destroy Country B's nuclear development sites and prevent Country B from developing nuclear weapons. The United Nations has [not] authorized Country A to use force against Country B to resolve the situation.

Immediately after the vignette, subjects were asked the following question: should Country A attack and use force to resolve the situation? They were given two options to choose from, attack or not attack.

The first treatment consisted of a simple dichotomous assignment of the regime type of the target of potential military action: democratic or not democratic. This treatment consists of a one word change in the vignette, identifying the target country as a democratic neighbor of the potential initiating state, or as a non-democratic neighbor. Democratic peace theory requires that democratic publics are not generally less willing to use force – only uniquely more peaceful toward other democracies.

The second treatment varies UN authorization for Country A's use of force against Country B. Extensive theoretical research identifies the approval of international institutions as a key factor in determining popular support for war. One strain of thought emphasizes the legitimizing effect of authorization by an international institution, such as the UN Security Council (Claude 1966; Finnemore 2003; Hurd 2007). A second, more recent, perspective argues that international approval plays an informational role, reducing the uncertainty of states about the likely reaction of the international community to using force (Voeten 2001, 2005; Boehmer et al. 2004; Fang 2008; Thompson 2009; Chapman and Wolford 2010; Chapman 2011; Grieco et al. 2011). The combination of regime type and international institutional support for the use of force thus defines 2x2=4 treatments.

International institutions could serve as either a complement or substitute to democratic peace theory. Since democracy is favored by the status quo, the lack of violence among

democracies could result from mutual satisfaction, rather than from domestic democratic institutions. International institutions such as the United Nations could also precipitate peace through their authority or legitimacy, or because subjects perceive information about UN approval/disapproval as impling something about the target state. Including an experimental control for international approval is thus critical in assessing the effect of regime type on popular preferences. While we are not directly concerned here with unraveling the causal mechanisms linking UN approval with public opinion, we include questions in the survey designed to determine whether respondents care about whether their country cooperates with the United Nations, whether their country cooperates with other countries in the region, and whether they believe their government should be more or less active in world affairs.

For consistency with previous work, our vignette discusses a crisis involving a hypothetical neighboring country's pursuit of nuclear weapons (Tomz and Weeks 2013). Tomz and Weeks (2013*b*) test four versions of the democratic peace through a series of treatments, varying whether the country is a trading partner, a significant military power, or in an alliance with the respondent's country. Since we seek to further assess the main effect of democracy on a more varied set of countries, and given their previous results, we hold these other factors constant. No information about alliances, trade, or characteristics other than regime type and the UN endorsement are varied in our experimental design. Scholars have sought to identify the impact of nuclear proliferation on interstate conflict (c.f., Sagan and Waltz 2012; Kroenig 2013; Sechser and Fuhrmann 2013), which may also affect popular attitudes about regime type and authorization of military force by multilateral institutions.

In our vignettes, we intentionally use hypothetical labels for the two states, referring only to "Country A" and "Country B." Previous work has focused on whether a respondent's own country should use force. While not unreasonable, vignettes that impose descriptive and/or contextual labels create major confounding problems. Consider the potential confounders if we were to ask subjects about how *their* country should respond if one of their neighbors

were developing nuclear weapons. For Brazilians, the question would be fairly abstract, as none of their neighbors has a nuclear program and none of their neighbors appear to be even remotely considering the possibility of starting a nuclear program. For Chinese respondents, the question is highly salient given the North Korean controversy and ongoing related tensions. These contextual differences could confound results and make cross-national comparisons difficult. But democratic peace theory is supposed to be context free. Countries in the theory have regime type labels but do not have proper names. A faithful test of democratic peace theory thus involves questions about hypothetical democracies or non-democracies, not about particular countries in specific contexts. We create a much more general framework for assessing the willingness to use force—one that more nearly reflects the axiomatic nature of theoretical claims about the democratic peace—by using generic country names in our vignettes, rather than purporting to characterize any particular set of empirical international relationships. Our approach is also useful in simplifying the process of conducting surveys in locations where government officials might be unwilling to accept more specific or pointed survey questions addressing national policy.

Our design allows us to test the generalizability of Tomz and Weeks' (2013) key findings outside the exceptional cases of the United States and United Kingdom. Rather than trying to measure public opinion experimentally in all countries, or even selecting a representative sample of states, we focus on a pair of "critical case" countries, where popular preferences are most likely to prove pivotal in fitting micro level opinion data to the macro democratic peace observation. As emerging, non-Western powers, influential in their own regions and able to act militarily against their neighbors, Brazil and China also offer a geo-strategic justification for their selection. Each is a member of the "BRICs", with rising status in the global system, even as each represents an important challenger and focus for opposition to the international status quo. At the same time, Brazil and China provide key variance in terms of regime type that we leverage in this study. Brazil and China are key members of the

most important group of developing states, each representing other nations in many critical respects, including regime type and integration into the international system.

Our survey experiment was conducted online in August and September of 2013. We collected a total of 4,214 responses from Brazil and 5,744 responses from China with approximate response rates of 53.9% for Brazil and 15% for China.[6] Survey responses were recorded in an online anonymous survey, with subjects recruited by professional polling companies in each country. Subjects were provided with an online link to the survey experiment, which was programmed in the local language, and routed back to the survey firm's website where they were compensated for participating in the survey. We adopted as many of Peifer and Garrett's 2014 recommended best-practices for online panels, and data were screened for duplicate responses. Following Tomz and Weeks (2013b), we also collected survey respondents' demographic information — namely, age, gender, education, income, religiosity, and interest in international news — and foreign policy attitudes, such as militarism, internationalism, and nationalism.

While each sample of respondents is not perfectly representative of the population of the two countries, they give us a good picture of the opinions of middle class, well-educated citizens, a sample population that is probably best disposed to reflect the values sought in democratic peace research. Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics of the respondents.[7] Chinese respondents were more militaristic and nationalistic than Brazilians, but they were

[6]We calculated the response rates in accordance with the AAPOR's Response Rate 4 formula.

[7]Attitudinal measures—militarism, internationalism, nationalism, religiosity—are scaled on a 0-1 interval. For the Brazilian sample, Cronbach's alpha for the militarism index was 0.28, 0.65 for internationalism, and 0.61 for nationalism. For the China sample, Cronbach's alpha was 0.49 for militarism, 0.42 for internationalism, and for 0.41 nationalism. Please see the Appendix for more information on each national sample.

also more internationalist on our composite scale. As expected, Brazilian respondents were more religious than Chinese respondents. In other respects, however, the Brazilian sample was comparable demographically to the Chinese sample. In general, both groups were young, well-educated, economically stable, and distinctly interested in international affairs.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Samples

	Brazil	China
Mean		
Militarism (0-1)	0.258	0.510
Internationalism (0-1)	0.599	0.718
Nationalism (0-1)	0.410	0.744
Religiosity (0-1)	0.338	0.098
Age	36.112	31.375
International News (days per week)	4.059	4.551
Median		
Education	Some College	College Degree
Income Quintile	4th	4th
Percentage		
Male	48.090	56.513
Religious	85.587	43.318
Overall N	4,214	5,744

Note: There is no significant difference at the 0.05 level on any demographical covariates across treatments, barring the Brazil sample's religiosity. However, the p-value for the ANOVA of the Brazilian sample's religiosity on treatment was 0.496, close to being insignificant at the 0.05 level.

Of course, in an ideal world, we would have a fully representative sample from both cases. Such a sample from China, and to a lesser extent, Brazil, would be quite difficult - perhaps impossible - to obtain. It would also be very expensive and well beyond our resource constraints. Especially in China, our sample overrepresents the urban middle class.

Our focus on elites also has some benefits. Urban elites are most likely to have opinions

on foreign policy. Furthermore, these elites are also the most likely group to influence foreign policy making. This is especially true in an authoritarian regime, where social networking sites, online discussions, and especially calls for collective action are closely monitored.

Results

The sections below review the major findings for our study. The results reveal surprising differences and remarkable similarities across two populations with very different cultures and political structures. A final section attempts to make sense of these findings.

Main Effects of Regime Type

Table 2 reports the effect of the target country's regime type on public support for the use of force in Brazil and China. Figures are the percentage of subjects in each country and treatment that answered "yes", when asked whether Country A should use force against Country B. Citizens of both countries were significantly less likely to support the use of force against a democracy than against a non-democracy. Only 32 percent of Brazilian subjects—less than a third—supported attacking a democracy whereas nearly 40 percent backed military action against a non-democratic target. The estimated effect of regime type was thus -7.7 percentage points in Brazil, significant at the 0.05 level. Chinese subjects were uniformly more willing to support the use of force. Over fifty percent of Chinese subjects supported using force against Country B in both treatments. However, there was again a significant, although smaller, effect of democracy. When Country B was democratic, 50 percent of Chinese respondents advocated using force. Support for using force increased only modestly, to approximately 53 percent, when the target was a non-democracy. The effect of regime type is thus 2.7 percentage points, again significant at the 0.05 level.

These experimentally generated effects demonstrate consistency with findings offered

by Tomz and Weeks (2013*b*). However, the implications of these findings leave previous connections to the democratic peace in some doubt. Brazilian subjects are reluctant to advocate war with a democracy. Chinese respondents show the same tendency, but are (a) more willing to use force and (b) less responsive to the democracy treatment.

Table 2: Percentage Support for Attacking and the Effect of Democracy

	Brazil		China	
	% Support for Attacking	N	% Support for Attacking	N
Democratic target	32.070	2,111	50.090	2,793
Non-democratic target	39.838	2,101	52.847	2,950
Effect of democracy	-7.768		-2.758	
95 % C.I.	(-10.658 to -4.877)		(-5.344 to -0.171)	

Note: The table shows the percentages of respondents who supported military action against a democratic target and a non-democratic target. The difference in the percentages is considered as the effect of democracy.

Table 3 shows support for the use of force by regime type and by UN approval. The effect of democracy persists after controlling for UN approval. For Brazil, only 38 percent of respondents supported a UN-approved attack against the democratic nuclear proliferator, while roughly 47 percent endorsed an attack against a non-democratic target with UN approval. The impact of democracy for the Brazilian sample treated with UN approval was thus -9 percentage points. The effect of democracy was also significant in the absence of UN approval, but was smaller. Approximately 26 percent of Brazilian respondents supported an attack against a democratic nuclear proliferator without UN authorization whereas about 31 percent backed an attack against a non-democratic target without UN approval. The effect of democracy for the Brazilian sample without UN approval decreased to -5 percentage points, smaller than its equivalent with UN approval but still significant.

For Chinese respondents, the effect of democracy was much smaller after controlling for UN approval. When force was approved by the United Nations, 54 percent of Chinese re-

Table 3: Percentage Support for an Attack and the Effect of Democracy, Controlling for UN Approval

	Brazil				China			
	UN Approval		No UN Approval		UN Approval		No UN Approval	
	% Support for Attack	N	% Support for Attack	N	% Support for Attack	N	% Support for Attack	N
Democratic target	38.086	1,045	26.172	1,066	54.434	1,398	45.734	1,395
Non-democratic target	47.729	1,079	31.506	1,022	56.868	1,456	48.929	1,494
Effect of democracy	-9.643		-5.334		-2.433		-3.194	
95% C.I.	(-13.836 to -5.449)		(-9.220 to -1.447)		(-6.081 to 1.214)		(-6.838 to 0.449)	

Note: The table displays the percentages of respondents who supported military action against a democratic target and a non-democratic target, controlling for UN approval. The difference in the percentages is considered as the effect of democracy.

spondents backed an attack against a democracy compared with 56 percent who supported military action against a non-democratic country, a difference that is not statistically significant. The effect of democracy was also smaller for Chinese respondents in the "no UN approval" condition. Approximately 46 percent of those assigned democratic Country B without UN approval favored an attack versus around 49 percent in the case of a non-democratic Country B. The effect of regime type was again insignificant. In each country, the difference in differences was not significant; variation in the size of the democracy effect was not significant.

The table also reveals the effect of UN approval on willingness to advocate force. In both countries, the effect is much larger than for democracy. For Brazilians facing a democratic target, UN approval produces a 12 percentage point increase in willingness to use force. The effect is even larger when regarding non-democratic targets (almost 17 percentage points). Both of these effects are statistically significant. For Chinese subjects, the impact of UN approval is close to 8 percentage points in both democratic and non-democratic treatments.

These results suggest several initial conclusions. First, there is an effect of democracy in Brazil, and evidence of a suggestive but not significant effect in China. Second, in both cases, there is a large impact of UN approval on the willingness to use force. Finally, our Chinese subjects are more supportive of the use of force than are our Brazilian subjects. The

differences between Brazil and China are striking, but may reflect differences in demographics or other features of sample variability. For example, China's sample is younger and more male than the Brazilian sample, both variables associated with a willingness to advocate force. We next conduct multivariate analysis to address the impact of a variety of demographic and attitudinal variables.

Robustness Checks

We complement our basic analysis with checks for robustness in the presence of control variables. We adopt two strategies. First, we use logistic regression to predict support for Country A using force against Country B, controlling for standard demographic and attitudinal measures. Second, we examine the simple effect of Democracy for different values of control variables.

Table 4 reports results from a logistic regression of respondent support for the use of force incorporating both our experimental variables and also attitudinal and demographic controls.The variable labels "Democracy" and "UN Approval" denote the experimental treatments. Following existing works on support for the use of force, "Militarism," "Internationalism" (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Herrmann et al. 1999, Tomz and Weeks 2013b), and "Nationalism" (Johns and Davies 2012) are composite measures that control for a respondent's basic foreign policy disposition. The variable "Specific Case" denotes our manipulation checks, identifying respondents who reported thinking of a specific real-world case when reading the vignette. Income is measured as a respondent's income quintile in each country. "International News" is the number of days per week respondents reported reading about foreign news, online or offline, reflecting a respondent's interest in world affairs.

The results reiterate the earlier summary tables: regime type and international organizations' approval affect subjects' attitudes toward the use of force, in both Brazil and China. In both countries, respondents are significantly less willing to approve the use of force against

Table 4: Logistic Regressions of Support for Attacks Among Brazilian and Chinese Subjects

	Dependent variable:	
	Support for Attacks	
	Brazil	China
Democracy	−0.359***	−0.188**
	(0.114)	(0.082)
UN Approval	0.662***	0.400***
	(0.107)	(0.082)
Democracy X UN Approval	0.103	0.018
	(0.154)	(0.117)
Militarism	1.627***	1.752***
	(0.128)	(0.077)
Internationalism	0.803***	−0.783***
	(0.223)	(0.246)
Nationalism	0.471***	0.825***
	(0.171)	(0.186)
Specific Case	0.208**	0.216***
	(0.087)	(0.066)
Age	−0.013***	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.004)
Female	−0.309***	−0.018
	(0.080)	(0.061)
Education	−0.081***	−0.048
	(0.031)	(0.032)
Income Quintile	0.077**	−0.011
	(0.038)	(0.031)
International News	0.038**	−0.007
	(0.016)	(0.014)
Religion	0.189	−0.041
	(0.118)	(0.066)
Religiosity	−0.169	0.074
	(0.117)	(0.156)
Constant	−1.516***	−0.898***
	(0.265)	(0.276)
Observations	3,282	5,431
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,015.057	6,811.196

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

a democracy but are much more willing to support an attack sanctioned by the United Nations. Variables for both treatments are significant at the 0.05 level in both countries. Both sets of coefficients are consistent with our basic results; democracy diminishes support for using force, while support for war increases with UN endorsement.

Many of the demographic variables are statistically significant for Brazil but not for China, though the signs are nearly always the same. For Brazil, demographic factors such as age, gender, education, income, and interest in international news are all significant at the 0.05 level. Older, female, better-educated Brazilians were more likely to oppose war, while Brazilians with higher incomes and a strong interest in international news were more likely to support war. The lack of significance for most Chinese demographics controls may reflect sampling differences. The Chinese sample is less demographically diverse than the Brazil sample; there is less variance to leverage in estimating these coefficients. Generally, Chinese respondents tend to be younger than Brazilian respondents; the mean age for Chinese respondents is 32, with a standard deviation of 8, whereas the mean age for Brazilian subjects is 36 and the standard deviation is 12. Chinese respondents are overall better educated with 73 percent reporting that they have a college degree whereas only 26 percent of Brazilian respondents claim this level of formal education. Chinese respondents are also much less religious than Brazilian respondents, 85 percent of whom reported having a religion.

In both countries, self-reported levels of militarism, internationalism, and nationalism had a sizable effect on the likelihood of a respondent advocating the use of force. Not surprisingly, a respondent with strong militaristic attitudes is more likely to support military action than are less militaristic individuals. Nationalistic respondents in both countries tend to be more favorable toward to the use of force than less nationalistic respondents. Higher levels of these two variables in China may explain the greater overall willingness of Chinese respondents to use force. Those who thought of specific cases in response to the vignettes were also more likely to favor aggressive foreign policy action, which may explain the relatively smaller effect

sizes in studies with hypothetical situations than in studies that rely on real cases.[89]

Perhaps the most striking distinction between the two samples occurs in the context of the internationalism measure, which produced large, significant but contrasting effects for Brazil and China. Internationalism substantially increases support for using force among Brazilian subjects of the survey experiment, whereas it is negatively associated with a willingness to war among Chinese subjects. We speculate that this difference reflects contrasts in how subjects in the two countries interpret the role of the United Nations. China's permanent seat on the UN Security Council may alter the meaning of UN authorization for some Chinese.

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[8]To check for possible heterogenous treatment effects by compliance, we tested our models on those who complied with our instructions to think of a generic case and those who admitted to thinking of specific cases. The results were largely similar and the effect of the treatments were consistent across the two subsamples. Including a model with interaction terms for the two treatments and the variable for specific cases also showed that there was no interaction effects between the two treatments and specific cases at the 0.05 level for both countries.

[9]In the Appendix, we include a table with the ten countries mostly frequently listed by non-complying respondents who admitted they were thinking of a specific country, rather than a generic one, defying our instruction in the beginning to think of the latter. These non-compliers were asked to list the specific countries at the end of the survey. We did not explicitly state a limit to the number of countries they can list and respondents were free to list as many countries as they can fit into the blank. Here we show only the first country they listed in their open-ended responses, analyzing only one observation per respondent.

Table 5: Predicted Probabilities of an Average Brazilian and Chinese Respondent Supporting the Use of Force

	Brazil		China	
	UN Approval	No UN Approval	UN Approval	No UN Approval
Democracy	0.377	0.219	0.534	0.431
Not a democracy	0.438	0.286	0.576	0.477
Effect of democracy	-0.061	-0.067	-0.042	-0.046
95% C.I.	(-0.11 to -0.014)	(-0.108 to -0.025)	(-0.083 to -0.003)	(-0.086 to -0.005)

Note: The table shows the mean predicted probability of an average respondent from each country to support the use of force, contingent on the target's regime type and UN approval. Attitudinal variables, such as militarism, internationalism, nationalism, were held at their mean and other control variables at their median of each country. The difference in the probabilities is estimated as the effect of democracy. Based on estimates in R, with first differences drawn from 1,000 simulations performed by Zelig (Imai et al. 2007).

Table 5 shows the mean predicted probability of an average respondent from each country supporting the use of force in each country, contingent on the target's regime type and UN approval.[10] Attitudinal variables, such as militarism, internationalism, nationalism, were held at their means and other control variables at their medians of each country.

The predicted probabilities generated reveal how these citizens react to the target country's regime type and IO endorsement. Again, the pacific effect of democracy and the rallying effect of UN approval are clear. Given UN approval, the predicted probability of the Brazilian respondent advocating the use of force against a non-democratic nuclear proliferator is 0.43 and against a democratic proliferator is 0.37. The probability of supporting war decreases to 0.28 when the target is a non-democratic regime in the absence of UN authorization and further to 0.21 without UN approval when the target is a democracy. Similarly, the

[10]Note that scholars have criticized the use of regression and logistic regression to analyze experimental data and proposed adjustments and alternatives for examining predicted values. We separately calculated Freedman's 2008 plug-in estimator and obtained very similar results.

predicted probability that the Chinese subject backs military action sanctioned by the UN is 0.57 against a non-democratic target and 0.53 against a democratic target. Assuming there is no authorization by the United Nations, the likelihood of the Chinese respondent supporting the attack is 0.47 if the target regime is non-democratic and 0.43 if the target is said to be a democracy. The mean difference in predicted probabilities between support for war with a democracy and with a non-democracy under the UN's auspices was around 0.06 for the Brazilian individual, while this same difference is approximately 0.04 for the Chinese individual. Similarly, the mean difference between a non-democratic target and a democratic target without UN approval was about 0.06 for the Brazilian and 0.04 for the Chinese when there was no UN approval.

Of course, the average respondent is not necessarily representative of the average citizen, so we also generated predicted values using population means and medians (not shown). The comparative patterns were identical as were the hypothesis tests. The only difference was that in every cell the predicted probability of supporting the use of force was about .05 higher for the population mean than for the sample mean. This was the case for both Brazil and China, reflecting greater support for the use of force among poorer and less educated subjects.

As an alternative robustness check, we examine the effect of the treatment as a function of each of the control variables. Table 8 shows the results. In the table, key control variables and their values are listed in the first Column. The next several columns show support for the use of force when A is a democracy, when Country A is not a democracy, and their difference. The key columns are those labeled "Effect of Democracy". The first, for Brazil, shows how strong and consistent the effect of democracy is on the expressed support for Country A's use of force. Of the 29 reported treatment effects, 28 are negative - meaning that democracy reduced support for Country A's use of force. Further, 23 of the 29 are statistically significant, and those that are not tend to have small samples and low power.

The results are weaker for China, but still fairly consistent. Of the 29 estimated effects, 26 are again negative, and the positive values tend to have very small sample sizes - in one case, just 11 subjects![11] On the other hand, only 9 of the 29 are significantly different from zero. This may reflect real variation within the population (the effect of democracy may be smaller for the wealthy 5th quintile than the middle class 3rd quintile) or it may just reflect lower power given the slightly smaller effect of democracy in China. Our study does not provide the power needed to explore all these differences, but several are intriguing and worth mentioning. The lowest education cohort actually had a positive treatment effect - they were more likely to support attacking a democratic Country B, but the sample size for this cohort was small. The impact of democracy was very large for subjects with low nationalism - but again, the sample size in this category was very small.

Discussion

This study provides evidence of democracy's pacifist effect among publics of all regime types. Not only are citizens of Brazil, a democracy, hesitant to go to war against another democracy, but citizens of China, a non-democratic country, are also more reluctant to strike a democratic country. Our results imply that the reluctance to fight a democracy is more widespread than many may have thought. Put slightly differently, rather than possessing uniquely pacifistic publics, democracies appear to benefit from a "halo effect," in which citizens of other countries are generally reluctant to initiate military aggression against them.

Empirically, the effect of democracy is substantially and consistently larger in Brazil than in China; in most comparisons, the effect of democracy is twice as big in Brazil as in China. These patterns, while intriguing, are also not statistically significant. However, they suggest a critical next step. We now know that democracies enjoy a peace surplus of opinion both in

[11] Only 11 Chinese subjects scored "Weak" on the Internationalism index.

democracies and in non-democracies—but are there systematic differences in the magnitude of this affect across countries? Future work involving larger data collection efforts will clarify whether there are cross-national differences in affect toward democracies.

Our study has other limitations. Like other scholars working in this area (Tomz and Weeks, 2013*b*), we used an internet based survey drawn from a commercial panel, not random samples.[12] Although Brazilian and Chinese respondents seem to share a reluctance to strike at a democratic target without UN approval, observed differences or non-differences may reflect different sampling frames instead of different or similar attitudes. The effect of democracy is consistently smaller in China than Brazil by a small margin. A bigger sample size may allow us to propose an alternative hypothesis about the differing effect of regime type in Brazil and China. At present we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference between Brazil and China.

One might also object survey responses from subjects under authoritarian rule cannot be trusted; our Chinese respondents might not be truthful. Living in a non-democratic country may condition them to refrain from expressing their preferences openly. However, recent scholarship on China finds that expression of opinion is highly tolerated, whereas collective action is suppressed (King, Pan and Roberts, 2013) Furthermore any concerns regarding subjects' self-censoring would bias *against* our finding the effect of democracy that

[12]Public opinion researchers have debated over the use of non-random samples and the existence of survey mode differences. In particular, many remained skeptical about opt-in Internet surveys and strongly preferred face-to-face interviews or telephone surveys with randomly selected samples. Some (e.g. Malhotra and Krosnick 2007; Chang and Krosnick 2009; Pasek and Krosnick 2010; Yeager et al. 2011) found substantial differences between telephone surveys with random-digit dialing and internet surveys. In contrast, Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2014) find that opt-in web surveys, telephone surveys, and mail surveys with identical questions produce similar results after weighting or matching.

we report here. To the degree that censorship and fear inhibit Chinese citizens from being more candid, our findings about Chinese respondents' significant unwillingness to attack a democratic target could potentially be understated. Chinese respondents could arguably possess a greater preference for peace with democratic targets than they will readily admit.

As they stand, our results call for a rethinking of and further research on the role of public opinion in explaining the democratic peace. Our results indicate that citizens in both democratic and non-democratic countries are less willing to support the use of force against a democratic target. This micro level evidence predicts democratic pacifism—a broader tendency for democracies generally to experience less warfare than non-democracies. Macro patterns offer little support for such a claim; democracies are not significantly less likely to engage in conflict than are non-democratic countries. The general deference towards democracies at the micro level is also in tension with claims and evidence that difference divides, that dyads composed of dissimilar regimes are more dispute prone than other types of dyads.Then again, deference to democracies in China appears smaller than in Brazil, allowing for the possibility that other mechanisms make up for what might be called the "difference deficit."

Appropriate logics appear to point in two different directions. Either researchers should return to institutional explanations involving differences in the nature of democratic and non-democratic regimes, or studies should focus on possible variation in the meaning of democracy in different contexts and among populations in different countries. Both approaches are reasonable and may prove rewarding, though each calls for a different conceptualization of the determinants of the democratic peace. We briefly review each prospect below.

It is more than possible that citizens' preferences do not matter much in formulating foreign policy in a non-democratic government. The greater autonomy of non-democratic leaders from public opinion is nothing new, though recent theory and empirical research pushes against this classic distinction (Weeks 2008; Weiss 2012). However, researchers who

differentiate between democracies and non-democracies have already accepted important conditions on the role of public opinion in creating the democratic peace, conditions that coincide in fact with the empirical observation. To say that public opinion explains the democratic peace, but only in societies where leaders listen to the public is tantamount to saying that the democratic peace really devolves to the reasons that some societies possess governments that are responsive to the popular will. Considering the endogenous origins of democracy would seem salient to democratic peace research, though this has yet to be explored with any seriousness. The causes of the democratic peace may ultimately devolve to explaining what causes democracy to bloom in some places while failing to take root elsewhere.

Democratic peace research began by trying to account for the macro observation by highlighting differences between democratic dyads and other pairings of regimes. One of the most appealing aspects of applying public opinion to the democratic peace was the potential to account for the macro observation with a single, unifying source of variation. If publics in democratic countries were different than publics in non-democratic countries, then differences in behavior at the regime level could be explained by this distinction in micro tendencies. If in contrast, as we find here, public preferences for peace with democracies are too broadly democratic, then the ability of public opinion to account for the democratic peace must be called into question.

The second direction for exploration is in contextual variation in the treatment. It remains possible that "democracy" means different things in different places. Perhaps the common response to democracy by subjects in Brazil and China is really not a common response. Democratic citizens may correctly perceive democracy while the subjects of non-democratic regimes may mis-interpret the label. Perhaps, too, "democracy" means something subjective in both democracies and non-democracies. If for example democracy is interpreted to mean "country like mine" or "people like me," then subjects in different countries may all agree

to treat democracies better without actually generating macro democratic pacifism.

While our discovery of the "democratic" nature of popular preferences for peace with democracies is important, we find an even larger effect of UN approval on individuals' support for the use of force. Our effort here has focused on the role of democracy and thus we have devoted less attention to the effects of the UN approval treatment. The strong experimental performance of UN authorization and its close relationship to concepts of liberal peace calls for further investigation. However, we can perhaps conclude both that the observed effect of the democracy treatment is not a function of authoritative cues and that such cues serve an important role in determining public opinion, as suggested by recent theoretical work.

One possible interpretation of both treatment effects is again that publics prefer peace with "similar" actors, either populations or polities. Both 'democracy' and 'UN approval' may serve as stand-ins for subjective evaluations of similarity. Lacking detailed information about what regime type actually means, subjects may be evaluating indicators of affinity, preferring not to fight those that are more like themselves or their nation. If the appeal of applying survey experiments to international relations is the rigor with which one can connect elements of a causal pathway, the Achilles heal is interpretation of these linkages. Knowing that subjects are partial to peace with democracies does not tell us much about the democratic peace until we know what different subjects mean by democracy.

Much else remains to be done. It will be valuable to extend this research to a larger sample of countries. It will also help to further dissect the meaning of democracy for research subjects, as we have said. The popularity of democracy in China might well derive from different factors than its appeal in Brazil or the United States, though we were unable to find any indications of this in the current research design. Also advisable is a return to theoretical analysis of the democratic peace, given that public opinion alone may not prove sufficient to account for the special character of the macro observation. Finally, it will be useful to continue to pursue a larger set of questions regarding the role of public opinion in

fashioning foreign policy. While it has long been clear that public opinion is an important driver of individual policy choices—particularly in democracies—international relations still lacks a basic theoretical framework for connecting the preferences of citizens with aggregate political behavior. In the absence of a theory of how popular preferences become foreign policy, it is difficult to determine how public opinion might relate to the democratic peace.

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Appendix

Table 6: Detailed Recruitment Statistics

	Brazil	China
Field dates	8/21/2013 - 9/17/2013	8/22/2013 - 9/12/2013
Number of invitations to take the survey	7,820	38,568
Consented to take the survey (raw N)	4,489	5,797
— Eliminated due to age	8	8
— Eliminated due to repeat responses	0	0
– Complete entries	3,282	5,431
– Partial entries	932	313
Overall N (complete/partial entries)	4,214	5,744
Response Rate 4	53.9%	14.9%
Median completion time (min)	6	4

Note: Overall N is the sum of complete and partially complete entries. We calculated the response rates in accordance with the AAPOR's Response Rate 4 formula. Our survey included a feature to prevent respondents from taking the survey multiple times by placing a cookie on their browser. Some respondents had the same IP addresses, presumably sharing the device on which they took the survey, as in the case of members of the same household participating in the survey. We wanted to allow this possibility and drop only those respondents who got the same treatments and produced same responses repeatedly from one IP address.

Table 7: Top Ten Countries/Regions Mentioned by Non-Complying Respondents

	Brazil		China	
	Country/Region	N	Country/Region	N
1	Syria	213 (19.667%)	North Korea	725 (45.087%)
2	North Korea/Korea/Koreas	206 (19.021%)	Japan	292 (18.159%)
3	Iran	151 (13.942%)	US	258 (16.044%)
4	US	150 (13.850%)	Syria	84 (5.223%)
5	Brazil	34 (3.139%)	Iran	68 (4.228%)
6	Iraq	25 (2.308%)	China	40 (2.487%)
7	South Korea	22 (2.031%)	South Korea	30 (1.865%)
8	Middle East	18 (1.662%)	India	12 (0.746%)
9	China	16 (1.477%)	Iraq	11 (0.684%)
10	Israel	14 (1.292%)	Russia	4 (0.248%)
Total N of Non-Compliers		1,083		1,608

Note: The table lists the ten countries mostly frequently listed by non-complying respondents who admitted they were thiinking of a specific country, rather than a generic one, defying our instruction to think of the latter in the beginning. These non-compliers were asked to list the specific countries in at the end of the survey. We did not explicitly state a limit to the number of countries they can list and respondents were free to list as many countries as they can fit into the blank. Here we show only the first country they listed in their open-ended response, analyzing only one observation per respondent.

Table 8: Support for an Attack and the Effect of Democracy, Controlling for Attitudinal and Demographic Attributes

	Brazil					China				
	% Support for Attacking a Democracy	N	% Support for Attacking an Autocracy	N	Effect of Democracy	% Support for Attacking a Democracy	N	% Support for Attacking an Autocracy	N	Effect of Democracy
Militarism										
Weak	24.543	1,149	31.025	1,112	-6.482***	30.342	847	32.147	927	-1.804
Medium	37.173	842	46.707	835	-9.533***	46.458	960	51.748	1,030	-5.289**
Strong	73.585	106	72.059	136	1.526	71.789	950	74.446	947	-2.656
Internationalism										
Weak	27.368	95	32.990	97	-5.621	83.333	6	80.000	5	3.333
Medium	30.860	1,442	38.184	1,388	-7.325***	53.198	1,376	55.866	1,432	-2.668
Strong	36.479	551	45.178	591	-8.699***	46.647	1,387	49.627	1,475	-2.980
Nationalism										
Weak	31.385	787	38.996	777	-7.611***	41.667	24	68.000	25	-26.333*
Medium	30.556	1,044	39.089	1,054	-8.534***	45.358	851	47.948	999	-2.590
Strong	39.777	269	46.586	249	-6.809	52.331	1,888	55.444	1,892	-3.113*
Manipulation Check										
Generic Case	31.052	1,549	38.316	1,532	-7.264***	48.044	2,019	51.284	2,102	-3.241**
Specific Case	35.460	533	44.627	549	-9.167***	55.642	771	56.870	837	-1.228
Gender										
Female	28.105	1,103	34.641	1,071	-6.535***	47.966	1,180	50.463	1,296	-2.497
Male	36.710	997	45.329	1,017	-8.619***	51.387	1,586	54.685	1,633	-3.297*
Education										
Less than High School Diploma	33.333	90	45.000	80	-11.667	54.237	59	50	72	4.237
High School Diploma	33.031	551	39.771	523	-6.740**	52.294	327	54.913	346	-2.620
Some College or College Degree	31.943	1,127	39.697	1,121	-7.753***	50.068	2,221	53.189	2,305	-3.121**
Some Graduate School or Graduate Degree	30.861	337	39.142	373	-8.282**	46.023	176	46.330	218	-0.308
Income										
1st and 2nd Income Quintiles	33.113	302	38.356	292	-5.244	50.974	308	53.151	365	-2.177
3rd Income Quintile	29.651	344	40.312	320	-10.661***	47.331	712	54.051	790	-6.719***
4th Income Quintile	33.261	460	37.427	513	-4.166	51.844	922	52.741	912	-0.897
5th Income Quintile	33.207	789	42.955	731	-9.748***	50.000	840	52.005	873	-2.005
International News										
Read Int'l News 0-2 Days/Week	32.349	711	35.972	720	-3.623	48.632	658	54.306	720	-5.673**
Read Int'l News 3-5 Days/Week	31.448	601	39.932	591	-8.485***	51.875	960	53.854	1,025	-1.979
Read Int'l News Everyday	32.197	792	43.384	786	-11.187***	49.360	1,171	51.421	1,196	-2.062
Religion										
Religious	32.572	1,707	40.573	1,676	-8.001***	50.161	1,242	51.290	1,240	-1.129
No Religion	32.331	266	35.855	304	-3.524	50.000	1,546	53.905	1,703	-3.905**
Religiosity										
Weak	33.933	834	40.247	810	-6.314***	49.071	2154	53.489	2,307	-4.418***
Medium	32.551	682	40.565	673	-8.013***	53.346	523	50.000	484	3.346
Strong	28.821	458	39.394	495	-10.573***	52.381	105	52.740	146	-0.359

Note: The table displays the percentage of respondents who supported military action against a non-democratic target and the effect of democracy, controlling for attitudinal and demographic variables. The difference in the percentages is estimated as the effect of democracy. Asterisks (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1) show the statistical significance of the effect.